



CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGIES: ISSUES AND CASE STUDIES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

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Introduction

Patterns of corruption vary from society to society and over time. This is particularly the case when we consider the “South”, the “Third World” or the developing countries. In order to understand the immense diversity of its origins, forms and effects across developing countries, we should examine the roles of both the internal 'stakeholders' in developing societies (such as politicians, business cliques and junior civil servants) as well as external actors (including western multinational companies and international financial institutions). In addition, reform strategies should take account of widely differing economic, legal and political contexts. Effective anti-corruption strategies need to be tailored to the social environment in which corruption occurs.

As a result of this variety in patterns of corruption, there are problems in evaluating the current diversity of corruption and anti-corruption efforts; many advocate a single universal strategy to fight corruption. The intention of this chapter is to assess corruption and anti-corruption strategies in Botswana, Ecuador, Hong Kong and Tanzania, as well as attempts to reduce customs fraud in Mali and Senegal, in the light of such universal solutions. The chapter starts by outlining the current framework of governance and economic and political liberalisation within which many developing-country reform efforts are situated. This new reform agenda needs to be examined with reference to the huge upsurge in interest in reducing visible instances of public sector corruption in the late 1990s. Why has there been a 'corruption eruption' in recent years? The chapter subsequently outlines the key issues that need to be considered when combating corruption. A central section of the chapter considers the diversity of corruption and anti-corruption efforts found in the cases that were examined during the UNDP-PACT and OECD Development Centre Workshop. The concluding discussion focuses upon the major strategic choices required in designing a short-term, effective anti-corruption effort and reconsiders the universal solutions proposed.



A Framework: Good Government and Good Governance

The academic and policy-orientated debate on the character of corruption – and the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies – has been changed markedly by events in developing countries and the former Soviet Block in the mid- and late-1980s. Arguments about curbing corruption now take place in a new context: we are in an era of political and administrative reform, structural adjustment and what Samuel Huntington has called the Third Wave of democratisation in developing and transitional countries. Progress towards the goal of reducing corruption in the late 1990s therefore needs to be set in the context of these new international policy imperatives.

However, the eradication of poverty, participatory development and the support of human rights have been long-standing goals (on paper if not in practice) for western countries and the international agencies they fund. Whether because of the ending of the cold war and thus the need no longer to support political leaderships in non-aligned or developing countries, or because of the shift in emphasis that has followed the end of Reaganite or Thatcherite approaches to the size and roles of the state, these goals have moved to the top of the agenda with a clear emphasis that funding will now be targeted to achieve them. The Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Participatory Development and Good Governance of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD [1997], for example, has stressed the key themes: poverty reduction, promoting gender equality, raising basic education and health standards and reversing environmental degradation. The OECD report, as well as those of other agencies and governments, suggests that such themes are best achieved through more participatory, transparent and accountable societies, with an emphasis on sustainable reform, including the promotion of economic development and liberalisation, the improvement of the social, health and educational prospects

of populations and the provision of a responsible and responsive political and legal framework.

This framework – usually termed “good government” – is expected to contain a number of key components: political legitimacy for the state through democratic elections and transfer of power, and an effective political opposition and representative government; accountability through transparency and the provision of information; separation of powers; effective internal and external audit; effective means of combating corruption and nepotism; official competency, such as trained public servants; realistic policies and low defence expenditure; human rights as indicated by freedom of religion and movement; impartial and accessible criminal justice systems; and the absence of arbitrary government power.

Good government is also seen as an essential condition toward the wider goal of good governance. Described as the “use of political authority and the exercise of control over society and the management of its resources for social and economic development”, good governance encompasses the “nature of functioning of a state's institutional and structural arrangements, decision-making processes, policy formulation, implementation capacity, information flows, effectiveness of leadership, and the nature of the relationship between rulers and the ruled” (Serageldin and Landell-Mills, 1991). Good governance, therefore, concerns not just the organisation and activity of government but also the ends to which they are put in terms of achieving levels of economic, human and institutional development which “benefit the population as a whole” and promote the “literary, education and employment opportunities” which in turn enhance the ability of the population to demand, and participate effectively in, good government (World Bank, 1991).



In general terms, good government is as an essential precondition for good governance. Good government is intended to lead toward a governmental framework accepted by a participatory public as legitimate, responsive to the needs of the population and committed to improving its welfare, competent in providing law and order and delivering public services, and providing an effective policy environment and open-handed in its conduct. Such a system of government would also want to disengage itself from direct involvement in other areas, particularly economic production, to concentrate its efforts and abilities on societal priorities. Once political reform is under way and centrally controlled economies dismantled, this argument suggests, liberal market principles can begin to promote economic development, which in turn should promote participation in the political processes. The long-term economic and political objectives would thus complement each other to work toward “an educated population, with both political knowledge and the will to act, coupled with a modern industrial economy, a homogenous society, and a long-established set of democratic political values” (Riley, 1992, p. 18).

Such conditions would produce an internally generated, stable and sustainable tax base and a sizeable economic class outside the political system whose involvement or participation in the political and administrative processes would

be less for self-gain than a belief in the promotion of, and the roles of, the state to regulate and benefit society whose confidence in, and acceptance of, the legitimacy of the neutrality and responsiveness of the state would be confirmed by its efforts on behalf of the population as a whole, in turn reinforcing the state's stability and financial viability (Theobald, 1993).

The new international policy agenda of the late 1990s thus involves a number of assumptions about corruption and the effective means to reduce it. Corruption is most obviously defined as public office, public sector or institutional corruption. The discussion of the reform of corruption is almost always conducted in the context of a 'governance' framework and involves optimistic expectations of both economic and political liberalisation. It is also assumed that public sector corruption will be reduced if the size of the state is reduced. Corruption will also be minimised through general economic liberalisation and through political liberalisation, that is, moves towards liberal, pluralist politics, involving a freer press, competitive party politics, and the revival or creation of other independent institutions, reducing corruption by making it more vulnerable to exposure. In this way, corruption will have potentially damaging political consequences.

Corruption and Change

Governments and agencies are increasingly recognising the “strategic significance that good government plays in the development process”, and that good government requires the “highest standards of integrity, openness and transparency”, as well as strong criminal justice systems, 'new forms and dimensions' of corruption, and its pervasive effect on government performance, on the use of public resources, on the general morale in the public

services and on the legitimacy of the state and the law (United Nations, 1989). As a precondition for sustainable reform, moves toward dealing with corruption have been emphasised while evidence of so doing is taken as a key component of a commitment toward good government.

This reaction to and concern with controlling corruption is in part a product of events: the



“corruption eruption”. In the 1990s there have been many well-publicised instances of public sector corruption in widely differing societies: Italy, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Kenya, Germany and South Africa, in addition to the case studies discussed in this chapter, have all had major corruption scandals (IDS, 1996; Hayward, 1997). Sierra Leone and Mobutu's Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) are telling instances of the grossly damaging effects of widespread systemic corruption and its effects in terms of political change (Askin and Collins, 1993; Kpundeh, 1995). There is also growing concern about corruption, fraud and organised crime in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Reed, 1994; Trang 1994; Kaufmann, 1997).

Corruption no longer seems to be just a temporary disease of modernising societies that literacy, development and good public ethics will cure. The debilitating economic, political and social effects of both petty and grand corruption can be felt everywhere. As a result, the evidence of commitment to good government and thus good governance that may have been

assumed to be implicit has now become explicit both with detailed programmes for reform (as has been issued by OECD's DAC [1997]) and by the threat to curtail funding to those countries which fail to act effectively to reduce corruption (as the World Bank indicated in September 1997). Such agencies have also mapped out the macro-framework and macro-issues for, and the consequences of, a commitment to good government and dealing with corruption has become a core component for the reinvigoration of the state's institutional capacity (World Bank, 1997), for ensuring society's trust in its leadership (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997) and for protecting the fabric of public life (UNDP, 1997). The numbers of public agencies and professional associations who have now issued public statements or policies on corruption and public sector fraud are substantial. But the more immediate concern of both the agencies and the countries concerned is how to approach corruption in practice: which short- and longer-term reform strategies to employ, and which perspectives on patterns and varieties of corruption to adopt to provide an appropriate framework.

Issues in Dealing with Corruption

A number of issues need to be addressed to understand corruption. For example, what is the impact of external organisations or activities? Do developing economies present different situations of corruption that vary in form, location and intensity across national boundaries? Such issues have a bearing on whether corruption should be dealt with in the same way in all political and economic contexts or whether it is even pertinent to attempt developing a universal strategy to fight corruption.

Seeking to identify generic causes or patterns of corruption within any single or specific developmental timescale, and within state activities, or without reference to related issues, is both comparatively complex and method-

ologically fragile. Although corruption itself is an age-old phenomenon with numerous proposed remedies (Noonan, 1984; Sen, 1997), there has been increasing attention given by academic and policy-oriented studies to the definition, origins, character and costs of corruption in developing countries since the 1960s. Corruption has often been a focus of inquiry in its own right, because it involves the undermining of public office for private gain, but also because it is intricately linked to other forms of lawlessness and maladministration, including fraud and organised crime. Its prevalence and longevity are a matter of concern for its damaging public and social consequences: it undermines the development capacities of states, distorts priorities and is



often a form of redistribution of money from those in poverty to the office-holding rich (although there are a number of instances where low-level and often very poorly paid officials have responded to the failure of the state to pay them their official wages over long periods by selling their resources – for example, the sale of drugs by health care officials in Africa – to generate an equivalent source of income). Corruption is also infinitely varied in its character in regimes, institutions and groups across developing economies and is often subject to differing approaches and attention depending on its political significance or its societal impact; for example, 'grand' or high-level corruption versus low-level corruption; judicial, administrative and legislative corruption; or corruption in various public services.

Academic interest and policy-making concern with the costs of corruption in developing and transitional countries have also varied considerably since the 1960s: general theoretical surveys in the 1960s and 1980s have given way to systemic studies and more detailed empirical work, for example in relation to economic liberalisation in the People's Republic of China. Academic fashions have echoed policy-making concerns and "moral panics" about corruption. The current substantial upsurge in academic and policy interest in the (damaging) costs of corruption in the mid-1990s is a product of growing concern about the perceived growth in serious corruption worldwide. Since the 1960s, academic debates have reflected some donor and government policy priorities: with modernisation and infrastructural growth in the 1960s; with equity and access in the early 1980s; and with structural adjustment, good (and bad) governance, economic and political liberalisation, and deregulation in the late 1980s and 1990s (Charlick, 1993; Doig, 1995; Harsch, 1993; IDS, 1996; Riley, 1993).

Incidental corruption is a feature of life in almost all societies, but it can be systematic in many public institutions in developing countries, if not systemic in society as a whole (Riley, 1983), and it can be both endemic and

planned. In many country cases, a key source of corruption may be a self-serving political leadership and a large, inefficient and politically-influenced and misdirected state framework within which individual and group private interests have priority over the collective good. Public officials have considerable discretion to accumulate private wealth through exploiting their monopolistic, low and irregularly paid positions, often in collusion with politicians and indigenous or foreign businessmen. Corruption thus frequently takes place in societies where there is considerable discretion for public officials, limited accountability and little transparency in governmental operations; in such societies, civil society institutions and an independent private sector are often weak or undeveloped. The establishment of corruption on a systematic or systemic basis may be a consequence of the perpetuation of existing inequalities and weak ('soft' or 'hollow' states) where it can thrive "on disorganisation, the absence of stable relationships among groups and of recognised patterns of authority" (Huntington, 1968, p. 710; Andreski, 1970) but its permanence may rest in a self-supporting dynamic because it adapts or displaces according to circumstance and context and thus its demise should not necessarily be "associated with political modernisation. Neither is corruption doomed to destruction as a political system matures. Corruption alters its character in response to changing socio-economic cultural and political factors. As these factors affect corruption, so does corruption affect them" (Werner, 1983, p. 638). At the same time, while it may be difficult to perceive "that public administration can even aspire to, let alone sustain, acceptable levels of honesty and efficiency against a background of punishing indebtedness, galloping inflation, chronic unemployment, dismal standards of living and the serious civic strains that such conditions inevitably produce, ...to assert that corruption is simply a consequence of underdevelopment runs the risk of embracing a rude evolutionism which envisages a proportionate decline in the volume of abuse with each percentage improvement in GDP" (Theobald, 1990, p. 164).



Understanding Diversity: Case Studies from Developing Countries

It is now generally agreed that corruption – whether incidental, systematic or systemic, and whether endemic or planned – has often been found to have profoundly damaging political, social and economic effects, although its political consequences are variable. It has contributed to political instability, military intervention and regime change, and undermined governmental institutions, such as customs, taxation and other revenue-generating departments, and service delivery (Wade, 1985), often as a by-product of the workings of a neo-patrimonial political order, as in Sub-Saharan Africa (Sandbrook, 1985). While the causes and consequences of corruption are sometimes difficult to disentangle from the newer issues, and the broader effects, of large-scale fraud, capital movements and money-laundering (Hampton, 1996) and organised or business crime and international theft (Levi, 1987), there is a current emphasis on the distortionary effects of corruption (IRIS, 1996; Goudie and Stasavage, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). There is growing international consensus in development discourse on the damage that corruption can do to the poor, to economic growth, and to public integrity (UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 1997). For developing countries, this consensus suggests that democratisation, public sector 'downsizing' and deregulation are not only desirable goals in themselves but also a useful means to reduce extensive corruption. The general argument that an important way to reduce public sector corruption is to pursue sustained structural adjustment while also liberalising politically and continuing to pursue improvements in governance does, however, need to be assessed within the context of countries' experiences of corruption.

At the UNDP-PACT and OECD Development Centre Workshop on 'Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in the Context of Developing Economies' in Paris in 1997, a

number of papers provided insights into patterns of corruption, its causes and responses to it. Case studies can identify distinctive patterns of corruption, specific approaches and possible generic solutions. The evaluation of the experiences of anti-corruption efforts in Botswana, Ecuador, Hong Kong and Tanzania, and attempts to reduce customs fraud in Mali and Senegal, also need to be set in this new international policy context.

Corruption differs considerably in developing countries. Because of this diversity, corruption is difficult to minimise or control. It is thus important to examine the specifics of corruption and anti-corruption efforts, including questions of culture, organisation and the effectiveness of campaigns, while also considering the more universalist strategies that have been developed in recent times. Examples of specific strategies follow.

Botswana

For many years, Botswana, like the former British Crown Colony of Hong Kong, has been feted as an example of a country with relatively low and manageable levels of corruption in a continent not noted for generally high levels of public integrity. For whatever reason, Botswana's political elite seemed able to manage the problem of corruption, even as they preside over a country with enviably high rates of economic growth (comparable to the growth rates of the East Asian NICs), a multiparty system and good governance. In the 1990s this reputation has been tarnished by the appearance of a series of corruption scandals. Kwame Frimpong (Frimpong, 1997) argues that corruption became a problem in the 1990's as a result of 'political complacency' and an optimistic assumption that the problem of corruption had been effectively managed. Frimpong identifies a series of scandals



surrounding the government's purchase of school textbooks (which involved a loss of US\$ 15.0 million), land distribution and housing management. The scandals led to three Presidential Commissions of Inquiry in 1991 and 1992, which revealed that those involved were amongst the highest paid in the land. These instances of the relatively rich becoming richer through corruption are contrary to the view that much African corruption is a crime perpetrated by the poorly paid. An over-dominant ruling party in Botswana had undermined Democratic safeguards against corruption, as well as traditional forms of accountability. Subsequently, the government established a Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) in 1994, which has reported annually to parliament. These developments reflect a political commitment to tackle the issue, with evidence of the commitment seen in the number of cases investigated by the DCEC, the number of cases put to the courts, and the number of convictions. The DCEC's 1996 Report pointed out that "earlier hypotheses that corruption existed in many spheres and at all levels in both Government and Local Government ... have proved correct". Like Hong Kong's anti-corruption strategy, Botswana's DCEC has developed a three-pronged attack with a focus upon investigation and prosecution, public education and prevention. Frimpong concluded his argument by suggesting that any effective fight against corruption in developing countries has to involve international collaboration because of the impact of MNC's and trade and other economic interdependence.

Ecuador

Dr. Ramiro Larrea-Santos (Larrea-Santos, 1997) spoke on his role as the Chairman of the Anti-Corruption Commission of Ecuador. The Anti-Corruption Commission was created in March 1997 with the intention of channelling civil society activities into the uncovering, investigation

and surveillance of corruption. The results of the Commission's work would be handed over to the legislative and judicial elements of the Ecuadorian state. The Commission's operations would run until August 1998 and had recently developed a draft law to institutionalise itself.

The pernicious effects of corruption in Ecuador had threatened the very stability of its democracy. Corruption was tied to some of the state's recent political dramas, including the uprising of the Ecuadorian people against the previous regime of Abdala Bucaram in February 1997. Many state activities under the old regime were affected by corruption: these included the customs and tax services, public building and other public contracts. It contributed to a completely inadequate service provision, and the politicisation of public finance and justice. Public contracts involved bribes of between 10% and 30%, while electricity blackouts of up to eight hours a day were in part a product of corruption. Customs duty evasion was massive, estimated at Sucres 210bn in six months. Dr. Larrea-Santos listed fourteen "main causes" of corruption and eleven 'most visible effects' of corruption in Ecuador. The main causes were a breakdown in ethical values, illiteracy and a non-transparent, politicised and over-centralised state. The most visible effects were violence and a sense of resignation about the effects of corruption, poor public services and increasing social polarisation and exclusion. A large number of anti-corruption initiatives in the legal, educational and social realms were under way at present, including the creation of new legal anti-corruption mechanisms, public education activities, and the investigation and prosecution of public officials from the Bucaram regime. Popular participation and civic awareness through civil society organisations were important elements in an anti-corruption strategy but, while it was recognised that educational and social issues (such as the reduction of illiteracy) were valuable, they were often long-term in impact. What was important was the identification of effective, short-term remedies.



The Ecuador case was also a timely reminder that corruption could have dramatic political effects: it had contributed to the political explosion in Ecuador in early 1997. Whether there was a direct relationship between corruption and violence was arguable; it has been suggested elsewhere (by, for example, Samuel Huntington, in the 1960s) that corruption and violence were alternatives in developing countries. Thus corruption did not always lead to violence although it often increased cynicism and decreased popular participation. Both petty and grand political corruption were profoundly politically alienating, and could have intense short-term as well as damaging long-term effects.

Hong Kong

Bertrand de Speville (de Speville, 1997) discussed Hong Kong's war on corruption from the viewpoint of his previous position as Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The ICAC is a statutory body established in 1974 whose sole purpose is to fight corruption and which had evolved a three-pronged attack strategy. Hong Kong was highlighted as an example of a society where the incidence of corruption had dramatically decreased over time. The focus of de Speville's contribution involved an assessment of the transferability and adaptability of the "Hong Kong model", the costs of the ICAC, the precise character of the model itself, the future of corruption in Hong Kong now that it had ceased to be a British Crown Colony and where there were question marks over the East Asian NIC model of development.

Corruption had once been a serious problem in Hong Kong: it was widespread, deeply rooted, well-organised and tolerated. It affected every part of the public services of the Crown Colony. The causes of corruption were related to rapid population and economic growth, Hong Kong's recently-arrived immigrant population (principally

from China where corruption was endemic) and the administration's wish to regulate and control the economy. Corruption was also an especially difficult problem in the police force. Public disquiet at levels of corruption, and the disappearance of a senior European police officer under investigation on corruption charges, precipitated action.

The anti-corruption strategy involved investigation, prevention, education and enlistment of support. A key element of the strategy was the ICAC, which operated in both the public and the private sector and sought to co-ordinate the separate parts of the strategy. It recruited mainly investigators from the police at first, but also employed civil servants, engineers, accountants, media experts and officers for community relations. The ICAC organised corruption prevention studies for public bodies and private sector companies. It also conducted mass media and public education campaigns against corruption. The character of investigations changed over time, with private sector corruption attracting increasing attention in response to public complaints. In the 1990s there were prosecutions of prominent members of the business community, including the Chairman of the Stock Exchange. The longer-term effects of the strategy were growing community trust in and support for the ICAC, a cleaner public service and business sector and a greater understanding of corruption and why it is damaging. In terms of the future, de Speville argued that Hong Kong would not slip back into corruption because of its experience in combating corruption, its separate juridical status and the commitments of both the Hong Kong people and the Chinese government.

How far the "Hong Kong model" would be transferable is problematic, since it is very much a product of a particular social environment and polity – a small "city-state" with a distinctive culture and a highly efficient administrative machine operating in a society characterised by sustained high economic



growth. The ICAC was well-resourced and used seconded and expatriate staff. It had intensive selection and training programmes and its public education programmes were excellent. While it was thus a relatively expensive model to emulate, it is worth noting de Speville's comment that the ICAC was not the strategy itself but was a mechanism for implementing the broader strategy that included the enforcement of the law and the winning of popular support.

Mali and Senegal: Determinants of Customs Fraud

David Stasavage and Cecile Daubree (Stasavage and Daubree, 1997) examined the determinants of customs fraud in the west African states of Mali and Senegal, which have many similarities in colonial heritage, state structure and political style, membership of the Franc Zone and protectionist policies. Customs fraud is an example of both loss of revenue and corruption. The fraud can be of various types, including under-declaration of the value of goods, misclassification and underpayment of taxes due. But in whatever form it occurs, it can have significant economic consequences for such developing states, as the revenue base of the state is highly dependent upon the efficient taxation of trade.

Stasavage and Daubree used standard principal-agent models as a basis for their research, although it was accepted that such models focus upon national-level factors and cannot predict results for specific customs administrations. Instead, they sought to compare fraud on a product-by-product basis within customs administrations. Their general conclusions were that trade liberalisation had reduced levels of fraud and that pre-shipment inspection 'can be a powerful tool for reducing fraud'. In addition, to reduce customs fraud, donors should support institutional reforms that reduce the discretion of officials and improve monitoring. Customs fraud is itself a symptom of specific national political

and institutional failures. Stasavage suggested that the size of public service salaries was less an issue in Mali and Senegal, when compared with other African countries. Instead, a key problem with the customs services in Mali and Senegal was the lack of funds for non-wage current expenditures, such as basic necessities (including fuel, vehicles and other administrative costs) for the officials to do their jobs. Furthermore, in both Mali and Senegal, changes in trade policies were related to the rise and decline of distinct business groups. Some groups of industrialists and merchants were losing the political clout to demand protection. Liberalisation was creating new business groups in the states, which were influencing policy.

In relation to one major possible reform – the use of pre-shipment inspection firms – Stasavage argued that there was a tension between the costs of such expensive pre-shipment inspection services and the revenue thereby gained. The improvements secured by pre-shipment inspection services were in part based upon accompanying reforms in the customs services themselves, particularly improvements in information gathering and assessment and the computerisation of the services.

Tanzania

Ambassador Alexander Muganda (Muganda, 1997) described the circumstances surrounding the establishment and the results of the Warioba report on corruption in Tanzania, which was appointed in January 1996 and reported in December 1996. J. S. Warioba, former Prime Minister and first Vice President, had chaired the Presidential Commission; Muganda had been both Secretary to the Commission and also the Director of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau in Tanzania. 1994 was a "low water mark" in Tanzania due to corruption scandals, and the 1995 elections produced anti-corruption commitments. The Prevention of Corruption Bureau was ineffective,



but a further problem was the lack of political will to give the Bureau strength to act. The Bureau needed complete re-organisation and more power. One important issue regarding corruption in Tanzania was the clientelistic links between businessmen and decision-makers, particularly politicians. These links had greatly increased corruption in recent years.

The Warioba report had identified “rampant corruption in the public service” which had escalated at an alarming rate over the past two decades. There was both 'petty' corruption and 'grand' corruption at the highest public levels. Petty corruption was widespread. Muganda said that it was “a serious nuisance” and had “subverted effective service delivery”. It was found in the police and judicial services, and in all the social sectors. From the evidence taken in public hearings, petty corruption affected most members of the public and was the main source of public discontent. Grand corruption had been identified in the procurement of goods and services, in the allocation of permits for hunting and mining, and in large public contracts, in particular in road-building and public construction. An assessment of 24

construction contracts had found substantial cost overruns: costs had escalated from US\$ 97.4m to US\$ 154.7m. There was in this an “inference of corruption”, Muganda said.

A number of causes of the growth in corruption were identified, including economic deterioration, a decline in public ethics, and the lack of political leadership on the issue. The Warioba Commission had made a number of recommendations to improve public integrity, including proposed amendments to the Leadership Code of Ethics Act, short-term vetting of public officials, disciplinary action against the police and judiciary, and the reinvigoration of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau. In respect of longer-term issues, the law in Tanzania was also worth commenting upon. Some laws created opportunities for corruption; they had to be amended. A final area of significance was “social engineering”. Public education, anti-corruption and positive public integrity advertising, as well as general measures raising public awareness, were all required. In Tanzania's case, it was important to remind or educate citizens to complain about corrupt acts and to try and prevent politicians from engaging in the bad habits of corruption.

Discussion of Case Studies

From a consideration of these specific country experiences, it is possible to argue that there are difficulties with an over-reliance upon one particular fashion in the anti-corruption strategy, one particular innovative idea or one model of analysis of corruption. An anti-corruption strategy must be designed with the understanding that the specific causes, occasions and appropriate corrective measures are directly related to a country's individual circumstances. Furthermore, a lot more attention needs to be given to questions of timing and sequencing, consistency in approach, the details of reform and its sustainability, and the exceptional political and managerial will necessary to promote and sustain reform in this area.

In Mali and Senegal, economic liberalisation seems to have helped reduce customs fraud, when combined with institutional reform and relatively high salaries. In Tanzania, economic liberalisation is part of the explanation for the growth of petty and grand corruption. Some states have embarked upon comprehensive reform programmes: in Ecuador and Tanzania, the anti-corruption strategies include expectations of the beneficial effects of long-term growth and literacy efforts, combined with legal reforms and institutional strengthening. But such listings raise important questions about short-term priorities and the inter-relationships between such reform efforts. Almost all the



country experiences discussed at the Paris workshop raised in one form or another the issue of political or managerial will: did the political leadership have the sustained commitment to anti-corruption reform or was it engaged in a merely 'cosmetic' exercise? In Hong Kong, exceptionally high political commitment, popular support, good organisation and a coherent strategy has yielded results, yet there are questions regarding the sustainability and transferability of such an approach. Botswana's case, with an equivalent vehicle for anti-corruption work,

staffed by some overseas officers, does suggest that there may be evidence that it has a role elsewhere, but its success will need to be gauged not only by the effectiveness of the judicial system but also through continuing political support as senior figures in political and public life are investigated. Tanzania's recent anti-corruption effort, with its inquiry process, needs to be turned into a sustained political and institutional commitment. The case of Ecuador clearly illustrates the outcomes of the political turmoil that gross corruption can cause.

Diversity and the Search for Public Integrity

The issue of the diversity of corruption is important. There are differing causes and consequences of corruption. The diverse outcomes of corruption and the associated scandal have significance in terms of both the short-term costs and the alleged longer-term developmental benefits. In some societies, as in East Asia, corruption may be extensive (if "isolated" within a distinct political sphere) but does not seem to be a barrier to rapid economic growth, whereas corruption is an integral part of the economic stagnation and decline of sub-Saharan Africa and has had damaging effects in Latin America (Diamond, 1987; Kpundeh, 1995; Little and Posada-Carbo, 1996; World Bank, 1994; World Bank, 1997; Saba and Manzetti, 1996). Similarly, changes in policy at state, sub-state and micro-level, have created in previous decades, and continue to create, new incentives and opportunities in levels, patterns and prevalence of corruption. Thus the Chinese government's "immediate concern over the stagnant economy and therefore the necessity of revitalising society" as it has "relaxed its control over resource allocation, given great autonomy to local authorities to direct investment and decentralised its managerial power over enterprises" in the economic sector led not only to the revival of old patron-client networks but also

new patterns of corruption (Gong, 1993, pp. 317, 323-4).

Furthermore, the diversity of corruption – and the perspectives and approaches of those reporting and analysing it – has had an impact on attempts at reducing or minimising the effects of corruption through anti-corruption strategies. Often the strategy proposed is based upon a distinct viewpoint concerning the causes and character of corruption. There have probably been three distinct approaches to contemporary corruption and anti-corruption strategies: economic analyses; mass public opinion, or civic culture, perspectives; and institutional viewpoints. Economic analyses prioritise the "principal-agent" relationship to identify corruption and anti-corruption strategies while mass public opinion or civic culture perspectives examine the social or cultural context of corruption and suggest, as a result, mass attitudinal change or civic awareness anti-corruption strategies. The institutional viewpoint looks either to strengthening institutions, such as the auditor-general or anti-corruption agency functions, or controls and procedures within institutions, such as codes and register of interests, to delineate the expectations of politicians and public officials. Thus Klitgaard's strategy is based upon



principal-agent economic analysis and is evaluated in a number of different developing country contexts (Klitgaard, 1988). Broadly, there have also been four levels of anti-corruption strategy: international, national, local and populist (Theobald, 1990). In the period since the mid-1990s, a series of international anti-corruption initiatives have emerged (Kaufmann, 1997; Riley, 1998; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Earlier decades have seen strategies based upon national and local action, including anti-corruption agencies, public inquiries, complaint procedures, and public awareness campaigns (Clarke, 1983; Heidenheimer et. al., 1989). A necessary but not sufficient condition to reduce corruption would be the development of a vigorous civil society, involving a plurality of independently-organised groups able to pursue their needs and interests. Populist initiatives such as purges of civil servants have not had much success, although the issue of corruption has acquired great political salience in recent years due to the actions of NGOs and other public interest groups (Harsch, 1993; Guhan and Paul, 1997; Riley, 1998; Theobald, 1990).

A further complication has been the growth of new concerns or activities that have an increasing impact on types and levels of corruption. Increasing attention is given to the activities of multinationals and other export businesses which have traditionally exploited own-country legal inadequacies, different cultural and procedural expectations, and tacit political approval for commercial advantage while governments themselves have used similar methods in pursuit of covert foreign policy objectives. In the case of transit-route corruption in the Caribbean and Baltic states, the existence of a weak or corrupt public sector, and thus the presence of a parallel decision-making process that favours certain sections of society, may permit criminals to: continue in-country and international criminal activity by creating 'crime havens'; accelerate both general crime and judicial corruptibility; adversely affect state

income through the links between corruption, cross border tax differentiation and smuggling transit routes; and subvert weak financial services regulation in creating opportunities for investment fraud, money-laundering and illicit capital movements.

It may be argued that it is difficult either to determine the causes or consequences of the diversity of corruption, or to seek to devise common strategies to deal with it. Assessing corruption in terms of instrumentality – incentive, opportunity and risk – or in terms of scenario – categorisation or actor-characterisation – also runs the risk of trying to impose an artificially uniform analytical construct. Similarly, historical, definitional or cultural perspectives have a role, but only in terms of longer-term perspectives on changes to cultural and societal norms. The immediate issues must be what type or types of corruption are the most damaging; what the relationships are between corruption and the wider good government and good governance objectives; how an effective, enabling state can act to reduce corruption; and what forms of anti-corruption strategy are most likely to be most effective in the short and long term to minimise corruption, particularly for those most adversely affected by its consequences, directly and indirectly.

Within such a context, the value of understanding the international diversity of corruption becomes clear when analysing best and worst practices. It is important to recognise that if states are serious about fighting corruption they will require a detailed country-specific assessment of the costs of corruption. This must include an assessment of where corruption is likely to impose the greatest costs, including tax and customs revenues, business regulation, state sponsorship of infrastructure projects, institutional reform, political commitment and public involvement (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). Similarly, the approach to anti-corruption strategies requires planning, thorough assessment, a strategy that focuses on corrupt systems and



not just corrupt individuals, and effective implementation (Klitgaard, 1997).

For most developing countries, the short-term goal ought to be finding the means to pursue the most effective and economical measures to

control corruption. How that is arrived at depends on a number of factors, including the legacy of previous anti-corruption campaigns, the reaction of the population to anti-corruption inquiries and the impartiality of such inquiries (Findlay and Stewart, 1992).

The Choice of Strategy

Thus there are a number of framework issues that would need to be addressed when planning short-term anti-corruption strategies in order to identify sustainable and cost-effective measures that have impact. These include consideration of the following.

Office or Officeholder

Should the focus be on the office or on the officeholder? Training officials provides them with transferable skills sought after elsewhere in the public sector and by the private sector, particularly in relation to taxation, law and audit. At the same time, trained officials working within an inflexible organisation or unable to effect results become demotivated. On the other hand, training organisations or officials in procedures may assist in sustainable competencies, particularly if new officials are trained in organisational practices which are less portable but which may inhibit the initiative of the officials or imply a lack of faith in their ability to perform their duties without such a control environment. Should there also be 'golden handcuffs' – attractive inducements to retain trained staff – or should there be an emphasis on performance by sanction where failure to perform adequately the requirements of the organisation is the prime criteria – and how far should organisations be trained in competency testing and staff appraisals?

Income or Expenditure

The issue here is whether the focus of any anti-corruption strategy should be on protecting state revenue – on the integrity and competence

of the tax and customs agencies and the roles of Auditor-Generals' offices – or on investigating evidence of criminal activity such as contract corruption. The former may assist in the development of a stable revenue base, while the latter may more visibly demonstrate the state's commitment to effective use of resources and to tackling corruption (investigating and prosecuting corruption usually means that the money has been spent or wasted and is often reliant on the speed and integrity of the criminal justice system for implementation).

Restitution or Retribution

What is the purpose of the search for public integrity? Is it retribution – the visible punishment of wrongdoers – or restitution, protecting state funds and seeking to return to the state those funds and related corrupt payments acquired illegally? While the former may rely on an effective internal criminal justice system, the latter would require not only on effective systems in other countries but agencies charged with asset tracing, confiscation and forfeiture.

Vehicle of Reform

Some reformers advocate the establishment of an anti-corruption agency; others suggest the development of an approach to more vulnerable departments or functions. Risk assessment of departments, procedures and activities that are most vulnerable to corruption have been done in a number of states, with the aim of identifying where corruption may have the most corrosive impact. This has the end result of targeting



resources and measures. The alternative is to establish an all-purpose anti-corruption agency to undertake investigations anywhere in the public sector. Without proper business planning, such agencies may become reactive or subject to political influence and, without means of performance measurement, focus on the wrong areas for the wrong purposes and with the wrong outcomes. There are of course a number of private or non-state alternatives, including greater involvement of pre-shipment inspection firms, of expatriate management in government agencies or NGOs and other outside agencies in, for example, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects. There may also be room for schemes that focus less on the risk than on the opportunity by seeking to 'design out' corruption through one-stop services provision, customerisation, benchmarking and publicity. Similarly, the rise of corruption and fraud to fund political party activity could be constrained by state funding of parties, publication of appointments lists and controls on political contact with government departments.

Measuring Success

A key problem is often the measurement of success, which can be exceptionally difficult. How both corruption and its prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution are to be measured is the subject of much academic and professional debate. One emerging aspect of this debate concerns the question of whether the focus should be on street corruption or grand corruption. Designing out corruption is often thought of as effective, although it is difficult to measure. A more responsive and open relationship between the public and the state is often the key here. Building national integrity systems is a longer-term objective that may raise short-term expectations but not be fulfilled and lead to public frustration. Tackling money-laundering, advanced fee fraud and organised crime in some developing countries may be part of an international response, but there is a question as to how far that response is dictated by the funding countries' requirements and where the greater benefit is accrued.

Donor Co-ordination

One of the interesting themes of the Paris UNDP/OECD workshop was the issue of donor efforts in this field. Virtually all donors now have policies on corruption, some of which are long-standing and others that have developed in the mid to late 1990s. There is a series of important questions about how donor efforts are to be co-ordinated. Who determines inter-agency responsibilities and co-operation, and thus ownership of both responsibility and the means to fight corruption?

Such framework issues are crucial to the development of a longer-term systematic strategy. While Hong Kong's ICAC model may be too expensive and too politically threatening to many countries, and other examples of independent agencies too limited or too constrained by departmental control, an anti-corruption agency whose agenda and focus is determined from the outset after internal and external consultation may offer the opportunity, with donor support, to provide an immediate, generic building block for good government where other administrative reforms would be problematical. The comprehensive approach to public sector reform that encompasses the redrafting and updating of legislation and judicial infrastructure, as well as the training, organisation and accountability of a reduced number of public sector departments, is also costly, time-consuming and prone to substantial slippage. On the other hand, the enclave approach of transferring activities into semi-autonomous, externally led and funded agencies is, unless long-term future government support is certain, a short-term solution that may well raise political interference, resentment among other departments and the possibility of the loss of experienced personnel to other organisations (Demongeot, 1994; Dia, 1993).

Newer anti-corruption initiatives seek a more integrated approach, preferably with a focus upon identifying effective, short-term strategies, that distinguish complementary action to be taken at various levels: citizen or popular, institutional or procedural, and major contract



and senior officeholder levels. Such initiatives, however, must first determine how to balance working through existing institutions with participatory groups or movements; second, such initiatives must be aware that government efforts at promoting economic development or structural administrative reform may themselves introduce new actors and patterns of corruption as development diminishes or renders obsolete existing corruption; third, they must take account of traditional, cultural and social attitudes, ensuring that reforms are seen as desirable, acceptable and practicable.

Thus, in seeking goals of political and economic development either voluntarily or under pressure from external agencies, governments must assess the most appropriate means to initiate, implement and sustain reform as well as provide a focus for co-ordinating and monitoring change.

Consideration must be given, therefore, to the degree that procedural or structural reforms may be introduced to limit the opportunities and incentives for corruption and to raise the risk of detection, while providing for citizen involvement, complaints and redress and while evaluating the appropriate means in terms of cost, impact, effectiveness and sustainability as well as the relative political and financial strengths of those involved in the corruption. These tasks may often be effectively carried out by an anti-corruption agency, and could be important in underpinning and sustaining the increasing attention which has been given to another generic response – citizen-level initiatives as part of moves toward participatory development, empowering those most adversely affected by state corruption and most alienated from the purpose of reform. The measures may include: legislative sunlight and sunset provisions; simplified administrative procedures and oversight controls (one-stop shops and the customerisation of public services, benchmarking and service delivery surveys); quick and effective complaints and redress (hotlines, whistleblowing, Ombudsmen and administrative tribunals); community involvement (awareness and education, transparency of and access to information,

citizens' watchdog groups); and ensuring the independence of the media. Many of these institutional reforms are associated with the ideas of “New Public Management” in western societies and as such are subject to various criticisms (Hill, 1997).

Citizen-level initiatives also have three further roles in terms of governance. First, they are intended to focus on the poorest members of society by controlling or minimising small-scale corruption through protection against the extractive and arbitrary nature of the state and its officials, particularly in relations between the public and the state, including structural reform (the effects of decentralisation and deregulation). Second, they encourage improvements in basic administrative activity by focusing on the citizen as consumer and customer while providing easy-to-assess performance measurement and placing in the public domain the information, the control over process and the right of redress; the previous absence of these elements has prompted the existence and persistence of low-level corruption. Third, they involve the public in a more direct way than that of party political participation, at a more local level and with more immediate benefit to themselves and their communities.

More integrated schemes involving a number of initiatives, including anti-corruption campaigns and the roles of anti-corruption agencies, have been developed within the context of what is termed National Integrity Systems where, it is argued, “leaders in the campaign against corruption can only achieve real gains when a society collectively changes its expectation of public behaviour, or when the people believe that they are entitled to expect a government that is not corrupt” and which is worked toward “in partnership with the government and the civil society” through awareness-raising among the civil society, institution building, prevention of corrupt practices and prosecution of corrupt officials and where the political and public wills are underpinned by the appropriate organisational and procedural integration (Langseth et al, 1997).



Conclusion

If there is diversity in both old and new forms of corruption, these should be taken into account when considering anti-corruption strategies. The cases considered at the UNDP/OECD Workshop illustrate both the age-old origins of, and the vitality of new forms of corruption, and the search for public integrity. However, all the cases illustrate one core approach for any successful strategy: exceptional political and managerial will is necessary to promote and maintain anti-corruption reform even though the case studies demonstrate the difficulties with universalist solutions. If, however, there are any other common elements of a universal strategy that are needed, then a number of basic suggestions can be made. In addition to institutional improvement, in all societies the professions should be strengthened – by enhancing their

professionalism, independence and technical skills – as part of a strategy to control corruption. Lawyers, accountants and investigative journalists all need help. Enhanced professional skills, as well as political and managerial will to control corruption, are more likely to be seen in democratic societies where the pressures of political competition often force politicians to act. Democratisation is thus a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the reduction of corruption. Economic liberalisation is also not a simple panacea for public sector corruption. But reducing the size of the state also reduces the size of the potential corrupt 'take' and enables the public sector to move towards the contemporary ideal of an efficient, enabling state. The 'corruption eruption' – the current awareness of corruption due to well-publicised scandals – will ensure that more effective means of reducing corruption are developed.

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