CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIPS AND POLICY ADVICE

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the empirical relationships between corruption and human rights using extant quantitative measures for a sample of 186 countries for the period 1980 to 2004. It uses three measures of corruption and 17 measures of human rights, which are examined using univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analysis and methods of estimation. The paper argues that some measures of corruption and human rights are better than others based on an assessment of their validity, reliability and temporal and spatial coverage. The statistical analysis shows that more corrupt countries have worse records at protecting human rights, even after controlling for other explanatory variables, such as the level of democracy, national income, population size, government consumption, and regional control variables. The implications of these findings for advocacy strategies are then addressed.

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INTRODUCTION

1. The explanation of the global variation in the protection of human rights has occupied the attention of scholars in the social sciences since the late 1970s (Claude 1976; McCamant 1981), while the first cross-national statistical analysis on human rights was not conducted until the late 1980s (Mitchell and McCormick 1988). Since that time, there has been a proliferation of studies using increasingly large and complex data sets for which an expanding list of independent variables has been specified (see Landman 2005a; Moore 2006). These variables most notably include the level, pace, and quality of economic development (e.g. Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999); the level, timing, and quality of democratization (e.g. Davenport 1999; Zanger 2000b; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Mesquita, Downs, Smith, and Sherif 2005); involvement in internal and external conflict (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999); and the size and growth of the population (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe Tate and Keith 1999).

2. In addition to these more general variables, there have been further and more specific areas of research conducted that include such variables as foreign direct investment and/or the presence of multinationals (Meyer 1996; 1998; 1999a; 1999b; Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999); the level of global interdependence (Landman 2005b); and the proliferation of international human rights law (Keith 1999; Hathaway 2002; Landman 2005b; Neumayer 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsuitsui 2005). Across all these studies, human rights are operationalised to include the protection of various civil and political rights, or more narrowly, 'personal integrity rights', and the data sets tend to vary across time ($15 \leq T \leq 25$) and space ($150 \leq T \leq 194$), yielding a large total number of observations used for econometric estimation of empirical relationships ($2250 \leq N*T \leq 4850$) (Landman 2005a).

3. In drawing on the achievements of the cross-national statistical and comparative literature on human rights, this paper explores the empirical relationship between corruption and human rights using extant quantitative measures for a sample of 186 countries for the period 1980 to 2004. It uses three measures of corruption and seventeen measures of human rights, which are examined using univariate, bivariate, and multivariate analysis and methods of estimation. The paper argues that some measures of corruption and human rights are better than others based on an assessment of their validity, reliability and temporal and spatial coverage. The statistical analysis shows that more corrupt countries have worse records at protecting human rights, even after controlling for other explanatory variables, such as the level of democracy, national income, population size, government consumption, and regional control variables.

4. To develop these arguments and sustain the findings, the paper is divided into four sections. Section One outlines the concept of corruption and develops an argument about why there ought to be a relationship between corruption and human rights based on ICHRP's own definitions of corruption. Section Two describes the main measures of corruption and human rights, as well as the control variables. Section Three presents increasingly complex statistical analysis that explores the empirical relationship between corruption and human rights, including univariate, bivariate, and multivariate techniques. The fourth section discusses the implications for advocacy and policy making in the area of anti-corruption.

CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

5. The ICHRP uses the following definition of corruption adopted in the UN Convention against corruption:

    > the bribery of national and foreign public officials, bribery in the private sector, embezzlement of property by a public official, trading in influence, abuse of functions, and illicit enrichment.

6. It also concedes that this is a working definition that includes the private sector and that the list of corrupt acts is not an exhaustive one, where interpretation is likely to enlarge the list to include other acts in the future.

7. In the spirit of the flexibility and interpretation that ICHRP encourages, we contend that corruption can indeed take many forms and involves a significant grey area between and among different sets of *practices*, *institutions*, and *culture*. In the short term, there are rational reasons and incentive structures that encourage corrupt practices in which particular individuals are able to make substantial private gains within the public and private sector. These practices violate the norms and principles of openness, transparency, and accountability. Such gains would not have been possible under conditions in which there is public scrutiny of decision-making, oversight authority and mechanisms for horizontal accountability, and a larger culture of integrity in public and private life.

8. In the longer term, as corrupt practices are iterated over time they become institutionalised and develop their own cultural logics that create a quasi-acceptance of such practices by society at large. Typically, patron-client and neo-patrimonial forms of interest intermediation create their own 'acceptable' systems of rules and norms in which it is expected that one must pay tribute to the patron in return for tangible benefits. Pork barrel politics treads a fine line between legitimate and corrupt forms of exchange. Where the stakes are higher and resources limited or poorly distributed, the maintenance of gains through corrupt practices not only creates a demand for the use of coercion and violence among state and non-state actors, but also a supply of such violence in the form of the violation of human rights. Moreover, corruption permeates state institutions in ways that undermine the protection and promotion of human rights, which continue with impunity. State agents within the police and judiciary can engage in corrupt practices where rapid confessions gained through torture and other forms of ill-treatment are rewarded through material and non-material means. We thus expect, *ceteris paribus*, that patterns of corruption and the abuse of human rights ought to be related empirically.

9. Since we adopt a quantitative approach in this paper as per its terms of reference, we can test the general hypothesis that there is a relationship between corruption and human rights using quantitative measures of both concepts that have been collected on a sample of countries over time. Simple bivariate analysis can reveal the magnitude and significance of this positive relationship using standard measures of correlation (e.g. Pearson's *r* and *tau* b). Indeed, Lindberg (2006: 153) reports preliminary findings that corruption and the protection of civil liberties are related across 48 African countries. But such analysis says little about the *direction* of the relation or the presence of other factors that may account for human rights violations (see Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989; Lindberg .2006: 152-154).

10. First, it is our view that corruption has a certain quality that makes it more institutionalised and 'sedimented' within the organs of the state than everyday forms of human rights abuse and that since corruption undermines mechanisms of accountability and oversight it should be seen as *prior* to human rights abuse. Second, human rights violations occur for many different reasons beyond the presence of corruption. As outlined in the introduction to his paper, the extant social scientific literature is replete with possible explanations for variations in human rights protection ranging from domestic variables such as democracy and economic development to international variables such as foreign direct investment and international human rights law. Corruption is thus one of many possible factors that account for variation in human rights abuse.

11. In the analysis presented here there is an underlying assumption that corruption ought to be specified as an explanatory variable for human rights protection alongside other key features of countries (see Figure 1). For the purposes of this paper, the other factors include the level of democracy, the level of economic development, international trade, population size, government consumption, and a series of regional 'dummy' variables that control for possible differences in human rights between the countries in Africa, Latin America, Middle East, Western Europe and North America, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific.

12. As we shall see, the model also includes variation over time, the possible 'feedback' effects between one year's human rights record and another, as well as the presence of 'error' or the variation in human rights violations that remains unexplained. But before examining the descriptive patterns and empirical relationship between corruption and human rights, it is first necessary to describe the main measures that we use.


Figure 1. Corruption, human rights, and other explanatory factors

MEASURING CORRUPTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

13. The analysis uses a global data set on 186 countries between 1980 and 2004. The process of case selection turned mainly to questions of data availability over time and was in no way a function of values on the dependent variable. Microstates with less than half a million inhabitants were eliminated but the remaining cases provide meaningful geographical spread across different regions of the world.

Corruption

14. We use three measures of corruption: (1) the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed by Transparency International, (2) the corruption index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) developed by the Political Risk Studies Group and (3) the corruption indicator from the governance indicators developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi of the World Bank (see Landman and Häusermann 2003).

15. The CPI and the ICRG are indices based on so-called 'expert surveys', which are typically carried out on an annual basis. The experts include politicians, businessmen, scholars, among others are thought to have in-depth knowledge of the country. The interviews are then coded, and aggregated into an index. The World Bank index is a weighted average of many different corruption indices, among which the CPI and the ICRG. The great difficulty with expert surveys on corruption lies in their subjective nature and their small sample size. The indices are aggregations of mere perceptions of corruption and are typically derived from a sample of fewer than 100 people per country, where the ICRG measure is largely constructed from perceptions of business elites. The use of subjective judgement is partly explained by its 'latent' quality and its contested nature, while small sample sizes limit the reliability of the indices.

16. Of the three indices used here, the ICRG provides the most temporal and spatial coverage. The data range from 1984 to 2002, which is a much longer time span than either the CPI or the WB data can provide. A major weakness of the ICRG measure is its limited range (0-6) and limited set of intervals (.5), which means that a country's level of corruption has to change significantly in order for this value to increase or decrease. Consequently, 'within country' variation for this variable is smaller than 'between-country' variation (this will become important for the multivariate analysis).

17. The CPI has a larger range (from 0 to 10) and with more intervals (0.1), but its temporal and spatial coverage is significantly smaller than that provided by the ICRG. Transparency International started collecting its data in 1995 and has achieved global coverage only a few years ago. This limited coverage has two effects. First, the number of observations is relatively low, as the dataset used in this study covers the years from 1980 to 2003. Second, the data are biased since they mostly comprise industrialised countries. Such a bias makes sense at one level, as there have been more 'expert reports' available in developed countries earlier. However, it means that an uneven majority of the CPI data concerns a small group of states that performs relatively well on corruption, which will produce biases in the observations and the results. Inclusion of regional dummy variables in the multivariate analysis ameliorates this problem in some degree.

18. Finally, the WB index shares some of the advantages and problems with the CPI. The variable has a small range (from –2.5 to +2.5), but this is not so much a problem as it is continuous between these values, with interval changes of one hundredth. This means that even the smallest changes of the level of corruption are measured by this variable. The time span however is problematic, since it is relatively short and skips a year each year between 1996 and 2002. This makes it hard to measure variation over time. Also, the number of countries is small in comparison to the other two variables discussed here.

19. All three variables share a methodological shortcoming by being inherently subjective. Both the ICRG and the CPI are developed based on surveys. Therefore, they are prone to bias. The WB index can overcome some of this criticism, as it is a weighted variable. This does not mean that the WB index is superior to the other two. On the contrary, despite its continuous nature the WB index is the least usable variable here. The fact that it misses time points makes it unsuitable for analysis of within-variation. Also, it has the smallest number of available countries of the variables presented here.

20. The CPI scores better on this point and is also reasonably continuous, but suffers from selection bias and has a small number of time points available for most countries in the sample. Therefore, it is our view that of the three measures, and taking into account their various strengths and weaknesses, the ICRG is the most useful variable for our purposes as it provides the best temporal and spatial coverage.

Human rights

21. Human rights are operationalised using several 'standards-based' (Landman 2004) human rights scales: (1) the Amnesty International version of the Political Terror Scale, (2) the US State Department version of the Political Terror Scale, and (3) a series of measures from the Cingranelli and Richards human rights data set (www.humanrightsdata.com) (see UNDP 2006; Landman 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006).[1]

22. The two versions of the Political Terror Scale use a coding protocol to convert source material about particular human rights practices into ordinal scales that range from 1 (low violations) to 5 (high violations). The rights covered by these scales include 'personal integrity rights' violations, such as political imprisonment, exile, arbitrary detention, and forced disappearance. The human rights data from the Cingranelli and Richards use narrower coding schemes (0-1, 0-2, and 0-3) and similar source material to provide separate measures for disappearances, extra-judicial killings, torture, and political imprisonment; the right to association, movement, speech, political participation, and religious freedom; empowerment rights; worker rights; and women's economic, political, and social rights. In addition, Cingranelli and Richards provide a combined 'personal integrity rights' scale that ranges from 0 (high violations) to 8 (low violations). For the purposes of comparability, the subsequent analysis transformed all the human rights variables so that a low score denotes a low protection of human rights (i.e. frequent violations) and a high score denotes a better protection of human rights (i.e. less frequent violations).

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[1] We opted not to use the civil and political rights measures available from Freedom House since there are significant problems with their source materials, transparency of coding procedures, absence of inter-coding reliability tests, and additional problems that make them unreliable (see Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

23. The main advantages of these scales include their wide temporal and spatial coverage, their use of a standardised coding protocol that provides comparability, and their use of inter-coder reliability tests and adjudication of scoring by the project coordinators and coding teams. Their main disadvantages include over-reliance on single sources of information and their inherent reductionism (known as variance truncation). Amnesty International and US State Department annual reports provide particular accounts of country human rights events, conditions, and practices, where subsequent analysis has identified significant biases for or against particular sets of countries (see Landman and Häusermann 2003; Landman 2004, 2005b). Like the measures of corruption, these measures of human rights are limited in their range, leading to a reduction in variation. They do not provide much differentiation among the world's best and worst protectors of human rights, and ultimately lead to a three-level grouping of countries across the world (see Landman 2005b: 98-108). The large number of observations across time and space, however, does provide significant variation and degrees of freedom to carry out tests on the relationship between corruption and human rights.

Additional variables

24. The level of democracy is measured using the combined democracy scale from Polity IV, which codes countries from -10 (full autocracy) to full democracy (+10) using a minimal and procedural definition of democracy (see e.g. Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Foweraker and Krznaric 2001; Munck and Verkuilen 2002; Landman and Häusermann 2003). The economic variables all come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (ww.worldbank.org). The level of economic development is measured using the logged value of real per capita income (GDP, constant 2000 US $). Population size is logged. Trade is measured as the total imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Government consumption is measured using total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

25. The first step in analysing our data is to examine the descriptive statistics for the corruption and human rights variables. Table 1 lists their mean values, standard deviation, range (minimum and maximum values) and the number of observations (N). The large number of observations comes from the fact that we collected data on 186 countries for 25 years. The descriptive statistics confirm the observation that we have sufficient variation and degrees of freedom to carry out the multivariate analysis below.

26. Figure 2 compares the mean corruption score across the different regions of Africa, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and North America, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific. The scales for the ICRG and CPI are roughly comparable, while as Table 1 shows, the range of values for the World Bank measure is completely different due to the way in which it is calculated. Nevertheless, the figure shows that levels of corruption are worse in South Asia, followed by Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, and then Europe and North America. Figure 3 shows the mean score for three of the main human measures (the two versions of the political terror scale and the Cingranelli and Richards measure of physical integrity rights) across regions. Again South Asia scores the worst, followed by very little difference between the remaining regions other than Europe and North America

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

| Variable description	Acronym	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range	N
Corruption					
Corruption Perception Index	CPI	4.660	2.421	[0.4 – 10]	869
Country Risk	ICRG	3.204	1.414	[0 – 6]	2,483
World Bank	WB	-0.064	1.012	[-2.13 – 2.52]	1,064
Human Rights					
Physical Integrity Rights	PHYSINT	4.864	2.367	[0 – 8]	3,493
Disappearances	DISAP	1.653	0.645	[0 – 2]	3,510
Killings	KILL	1.317	0.778	[0 – 2]	3,507
Political imprisonment	POLPRIS	1.088	0.855	[0 – 2]	3,515
Torture	TORT	0.798	0.751	[0 – 2]	3,513
Empowerment	EMPINX	5.884	3.282	[0 – 10]	3,515
Association	ASSN	1.071	0.855	[0 – 2]	3,605
Movement	MOVE	0.706	0.456	[0 – 1]	3,527
Speech	SPEECH	1.039	0.740	[0 – 2]	3,526
Political Participation	POLPAR	1.104	0.854	[0 – 2]	3,525
Religious Freedom	RELFRE	0.617	0.470	[0 – 1]	3,526
Worker rights	WORKER	0.993	0.797	[0 – 2]	3,523
Women's Econ Rights	WECON	1.316	0.634	[0 – 3]	3,455
Women's political rights	WOPOL	1.702	0.662	[0 – 3]	3,510
Women's social rights	WOSOC	1.228	0.838	[0 – 3]	3,408
Political Terror Scale (Amnesty)	PTSAI	2.672	1.133	[1 – 5]	3,279
Political Terror Scale (US State)	PTSSD	2.493	1.169	[1 – 5]	3,554

Figure 2. Mean corruption score across regions

Figure 3. Mean human rights scores across regions

27. Bivariate analysis of the corruption and human rights variables (reported in Table 2) shows a remarkable consistency in the first order empirical relationships. All the correlation co-efficients are significant at the 99.99% probability level of confidence ($p < .001$). Reading down the co-efficients reported in the first three columns of Table 2 shows that the three corruption measures are highly inter-correlated, and all the corruption measures are all positively correlated with the various human rights measures. The co-efficients vary from a low association of .26 to a high association of .71. This variance in the co-efficients is expected since corruption will be differently related to different rights violations and corruption is one of many factors that accounts for variation in human rights protection. On balance, however, the table shows that as expected, countries with more corruption have a worse record at protecting human rights.

28. As outlined above, corruption is one of many possible factors that may account for the variation in human rights protection. Thus, it is imperative to move the analysis beyond simple bi-variate correlations to a fuller specified multivariate model that includes other explanatory variables alongside corruption. We thus have specified the additional variables drawing on the extant social scientific literature in this area. The analysis tests for the independent effects of the corruption on human rights while also testing for the independent effects of the other explanatory variables. In this way, the statistical estimations control for the presence of the other variables while allowing us to focus on the main relationship between corruption and human rights. Based on our arguments in Section One of the paper, we specify human rights as the dependent variable, while corruption and the other variables are considered the independent variables.

29. Our data set follows by now what has become a standard construction of a matrix of cross-section and time-series units, where variation in the variables and the number of observations are maximised across time and space. Such data sets do, however present a number of problems. In addition to the standard problems (for which we introduce appropriate controls) such as auto-correlation and heteroscedasticity common to these data sets (see Beck and Katz 1995), our data set has the additional problems associated with time invariant or nearly time invariant variables (Plümper and Troeger 2007). Standard fixed effects regression techniques for pooled cross section time series models that include such invariant or nearly invariant variables have been shown to produce inefficient estimators, which may lead to making false inferences about the empirical relationships that have been analysed. Plümper and Troeger (2007) have devised a three-stage regression technique that 'decomposes' the explained and unexplained elements of the fixed effects and produces final estimates that take into account the particular qualities of invariant or nearly invariant variables.

30. The basic rule of thumb in using this method of estimation is to compare the 'between-unit variation' to the 'within unit variation' of our variables. If the between unit variation is 2.5 times greater than the within unit variation, then we specify the variables as invariant or nearly invariant. In other words, those variables that exhibit greater variation across countries than over time are considered time invariant or nearly time invariant. For our data set, economic development, trade, government consumption, and population size are the time invariant or nearly time invariant variables. We thus adopt the fixed effect vector decomposition method of estimation and specify these variables in the procedure as invariant.

Table 2. **Correlation Matrix for all corruption and human rights measures**

	CPI	ICRG	WB	Physint	Disap	Kill	Polpris	Tort	Empinx	Assn	Move	Speech	Polpar
CPI	1.00												
ICRG	0.81	1.00											
WB	0.97	0.76	1.00										
Physint	0.66	0.48	0.60	1.00									
Disap	0.36	0.27	0.35	0.74	1.00								
Kill	0.56	0.37	0.51	0.83	0.59	1.00							
Polpris	0.46	0.38	0.42	0.78	0.41	0.46	1.00						
Tort	0.68	0.68	0.58	0.78	0.39	0.56	0.48	1.00					
Empinx	0.55	0.42	0.49	0.51	0.26	0.29	0.61	0.39	1.00				
Assn	0.39	0.35	0.38	0.44	0.20	0.23	0.57	0.31	0.77	1.00			
Move	0.39	0.26	0.35	0.40	0.24	0.25	0.44	0.29	0.76	0.50	1.00		
Speech	0.54	0.40	0.49	0.47	0.26	0.29	0.55	0.35	0.80	0.67	0.49	1.00	
Polpar	0.43	0.38	0.42	0.42	0.21	0.22	0.54	0.29	0.83	0.74	0.52	0.68	1.00
Relfre	0.35	0.26	0.29	0.30	0.13	0.13	0.41	0.25	0.74	0.49	0.45	0.45	0.47
Worker	0.51	0.39	0.44	0.41	0.19	0.28	0.45	0.34	0.75	0.59	0.43	0.56	0.56
Wecon	0.63	0.46	0.57	0.41	0.23	0.32	0.36	0.35	0.43	0.37	0.28	0.36	0.41
Wopol	0.42	0.27	0.30	0.18	0.10	0.07	0.27	0.10	0.37	0.38	0.18	0.30	0.41
Wosoc	0.66	0.53	0.54	0.42	0.20	0.32	0.41	0.37	0.50	0.45	0.31	0.44	0.47
Ptsai	0.58	0.51	0.53	0.78	0.57	0.66	0.58	0.58	0.40	0.33	0.31	0.38	0.32
Ptssd	0.71	0.55	0.67	0.82	0.60	0.72	0.60	0.65	0.49	0.41	0.38	0.46	0.40

	Relfre	Worker	Wecon	Wopol	Wosoc	Ptssai	Ptssd
Relfre	1.00						
Worker	0.42	1.00					
Wecon	0.25	0.40	1.00				
Wopol	0.24	0.31	0.40	1.00			
Wosoc	0.30	0.43	0.73	0.45	1.00		
Ptssai	0.21	0.36	0.39	0.18	0.43	1.00	
Ptssd	0.27	0.42	0.43	0.18	0.45	0.82	1.00

All correlations are significant at the p<0.001 level.

31. In addition to these considerations relating to our method of estimation, we reduced the number of human rights variables under consideration to include the two versions of the political terror scale, the physical integrity rights measures from Cingranelli and Richards, and a combined human rights score. For the combined score, the bi-variate correlations in Table 2 show the existence of clusters of large and significant correlation coefficients between the human rights scales, suggesting that they are measuring aspects of the same underlying dimension. Given this high degree of agreement among the different scales, we extracted a single component in an effort to reduce the group of interrelated human rights variables into one common factor-score using regression.[2] The resulting factor loadings (not reported here) showed a strong relationship between each variable and the common underlying dimension they all measure. The resulting human rights factor score ranges from low values denoting poor record of human rights protection (i.e. high violations) to high values denoting a better record of human rights protection (i.e. low violations).

32. The results of the multivariate regression using the vector decomposition method of estimation are reported in Tables 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d. Table 3a reports the results for the Cingranelli and Richards physical integrity rights measure of human rights and the three different measure of corruption. The ICRG and World Bank measures of corruption show a positive and significant relationship between better scores for corruption and better levels of human rights protection. The CPI is not significant. These findings are upheld in the presence of the additional independent variables and regional dummy variables. Better levels of democracy and economic development are positively related to better records of human rights protection, while trade and government consumption are not significantly related to human rights. The regional variables show that while the relationship between corruption and human rights is positive and significant, countries in Africa, Latin America, South Asia, and East Asia and the Pacific start out with significantly worse human rights records than those countries in Europe and North America. We have thus controlled for the regional differences and have demonstrated a positive and significant relationship between corruption and human rights.

33. Table 3b reports the results for the political terror scale that codes the US State Department reports, while Table 3c reports the results for the version that codes the Amnesty International reports. The results across the two tables are consistent. Only the ICRG measure of corruption is significant, while the co-efficients for the other variables show approximately the same magnitude and direction and levels of significance as those reported in Table 3a. The absence of significance for the World Bank and CPI measures of corruption is partly explained by the fact that they have not been produced on annual basis, and in the case of the CPI, were initially produced for developed countries only. Finally, Table 3d reports the results for the combined human rights factor score. As in Table 3a, the ICRG and World Bank measures are significant, while the CPI is not. The co-efficients for the other variables have approximately the same magnitude, direction and significance.

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[2] Given a different time coverage across the scales, we adopted the 'substitute missing values with the mean' option to deal with missing cases, and ensure the widest coverage of the factor-score. This procedure is justified by the fact that missing cases are randomly distributed both across indicators and across countries (note also that for each country year between 1980 and 2003, at least 2 indicators were available).

Table 3a   Physical Integrity Rights (Cingranelli and Richards)

	ICRG	CPI	WB/KKM
ICRG	0.065*		
	(0.038)		
CPI		0.080	
		(0.095)	
WB/KKM			0.472**
			(0.206)
Polity 4 (net)	0.035***	0.057***	0.044**
	(0.008)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Ln GDP per capita	0.405***	0.458**	0.164
	(0.090)	(0.149)	(0.156)
Ln Population	-0.746***	-0.560***	-0.695***
	(0.081)	(0.128)	(0.137)
Ln Trade	-0.048	-0.440***	0.174
	(0.071)	(0.102)	(0.124)
Ln Government Consumption	0.013	-0.148	0.113
	(0.077)	(0.126)	(0.132)
Africa	-0.599***	-1.120***	-0.233
	(0.121)	(0.145)	(0.151)
Latin America	-1.513***	-1.729***	-0.863***
	(0.111)	(0.130)	(0.155)
Middle East	-1.451***	-2.398***	-1.450***
	(0.120)	(0.160)	(0.166)
Western Europe North America	0.674***	0.411**	0.211
	(0.132)	(0.149)	(0.202)
South Asia	-0.445**	-2.152***	-1.282***
	(0.189)	(0.242)	(0.284)
East Asia Pacific	-0.049	-0.503**	-0.525**
	(0.132)	(0.146)	(0.204)
Constant	14.223***	16.002***	12.105***
	(0.815)	(1.189)	(1.309)
R²	0.747	0.887	0.824
Observations	1,570	411	568

Table 3b.   Political Terror Scale (US State Department)

	ICRG	CPI	WB/KKM
ICRG	0.083***		
	(0.017)		
CPI		0.023	
		(0.047)	
WB/KKM			0.142
			(0.102)
Polity 4 (net)	0.012**	-0.013**	0.005
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Ln GDP per capita	0.197***	0.298***	0.027
	(0.041)	(0.075)	0.079
Ln Population	-0.369***	-0.385***	-0.494***
	(0.037)	(0.064)	0.068
Ln Trade	0.117***	-0.099*	0.010
	(0.032)	(0.051)	(0.061)
Ln Government	0.066*	0.004	0.163**
Consumption	(0.035)	(0.062)	(0.066)
Africa	-0.117**	-0.334***	-0.266**
	(0.058)	(0.080)	(0.079)
Latin America	-0.663***	-0.551***	-0.367***
	(0.051)	(0.064)	(0.077)
Middle East	-0.664***	-0.890***	-0.530***
	(0.055)	(0.078)	(0.082)
Western Europe	0.173**	0.224**	0.306**
North America	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.103)
South Asia	0.040	-0.146	-0.073
	(0.087)	(0.119)	(0.142)
East Asia Pacific	0.125**	0.099	0.153
	(0.061)	(0.072)	(0.102)
Constant	6.101**	8.174***	7.908***
	(0.380)	(0.607)	(0.640)
R^2	0.760	0.887	0.828
Observations	1,543	385	556

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Standard deviations are given between parentheses.
All models have Prais-Winsten autoregressive controls.

Table 3c. **Political Terror Scale (Amnesty International)**

	ICRG	CPI	WB/KKM
ICRG	0.053**		
	(0.021)		
CPI		-0.038	
		(0.067)	
WB/KKM			0.063
			(0.120)
Polity 4 (net)	0.016***	0.014*	0.024**
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Ln GDP per capita	0.256***	0.701***	0.349***
	(0.049)	(0.098)	(0.091)
Ln Population	-0.306***	0.003	-0.137**
	(0.044)	(0.086)	(0.079)
Ln Trade	0.077**	-0.244***	-0.010
	(0.038)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Ln Government	0.002	-0.393***	-0.185**
Consumption	(0.042)	(0.083)	(0.076)
Africa	0.116	-0.295**	-0.349***
	(0.071)	(0.110)	(0.094)
Latin America	-0.676***	-0.871***	-0.674***
	0.062	(0.087)	(0.090)
Middle East	-0.721***	-1.009***	-0.754***
	(0.066)	(0.100)	(0.094)
Western Europe	0.306***	0.416***	0.322**
North America	(0.077)	(0.106)	(0.124)
South Asia	0.187*	-0.272*	-0.093
	(0.101)	(0.153)	(0.157)
East Asia Pacific	0.184**	0.095	-0.090
	(0.073)	(0.095)	(0.116)
Constant	6.085***	8.141***	7.302***
	(0.446)	(0.819)	(0.746)
R²	0.721	0.830	0.792
Observations	1,339	307	490

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Standard deviations are given between parentheses.
All models have Prais-Winsten autoregressive controls.

Table 3d.   Human Rights Factor

	ICRG	CPI	WB/KKM
ICRG	0.044**		
	(0.013)		
CPI		-0.023	
		(0.037)	
WB/KKM			0.136*
			(0.075)
Polity 4 (net)	0.016***	0.006	0.014**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ln GDP per capita	0.189***	0.418***	0.142**
	(0.032)	(0.056)	(0.057)
Ln Population	-0.362***	-0.234***	-0.298***
	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.049)
Ln Trade	0.046*	-0.204***	0.046
	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.045)
Ln Government	0.039	-0.160**	0.001
Consumption	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Africa	-0.016	-0.372***	-0.240***
	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.058)
Latin America	-0.623***	-0.716***	-0.434***
	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.056)
Middle East	-0.564***	-0.879***	-0.602***
	(0.043)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Western Europe	0.271***	0.355***	0.291***
North America	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.077)
South Asia	0.115*	-0.308***	-0.209**
	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.098)
East Asia Pacific	0.169***	0.114**	-0.019
	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.072)
Constant	3.530***	5.496***	3.801***
	(0.290)	(0.461)	(0.471)
R^2	0.803	0.922	0.891
Observations	1,289	299	474

Note: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Standard deviations are given between parentheses.
All models have Prais-Winsten autoregressive controls.

34. The final step in our analysis is to examine the cross-national patterns in the relationship between corruption and human rights. For this analysis, we use the ICRG measure of corruption, which was the most consistent and significant, and the human rights factor score, which has a normal distribution across the world. Figure 4 is a scatter plot between corruption on the horizontal axis and the human rights factor score on the vertical axis. We use the year 2003. The relationships revealed through the bivariate and multivariate analysis suggest that there should be a positive relationship between high corruption scores (i.e. low corruption) and high human rights scores (i.e. good records of protection). Countries that fall on the line confirm the general hypothesis, while the 'outliers' provide a good insight into those countries in which corruption is high and rights protection is good, or those countries in which corruption is low and rights protection is not particularly good. While battling corruption in general is good for improving the human rights situation in a country, it is these contradictory and 'deviant' cases that require additional attention.


Figure 4. Corruption and human rights, 2003

35. Figure 4 shows that there are many countries of interest for this particular year. On the one hand, there are those countries that have reasonably good scores on corruption and yet have weaker records for human rights, such as Brazil, Kenya, Cote D'Ivoire, Israel, and Colombia (although Colombia has experienced severe internal conflict). On the other hand, there are those countries that have relatively bad scores on corruption and yet have stronger records for human rights, such as Niger, Paraguay, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Mozambique. The number and position of countries that fall off the line explain the relatively weak relationship overall between corruption and human rights and confirm that factors other than corruption account for the variation in human rights that we observe. Moreover, while the scatter plot is illuminating, it is but a snapshot of the world and even if the relationship is shown for other years (see Figure 5), the

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correlation reveals little as to why at different moments of comparison countries have a mixed record on corruption and human rights.


Figure 5. Corruption and human rights, 1984-2003

IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGNS

36. This paper has presented measures of corruption and human rights, and then specified and tested a model of the relationship between the two using bivariate and multivariate analysis. The bivariate analysis showed a consistent and positive relationship between the three measures of corruption on the one hand and between the measures of corruption and human rights on the other. The positive and significant coefficients lend initial support to the hypothesis that higher levels of corruption are related to worse records of human rights protection. Scatter plot analysis also revealed that certain outlier cases warrant additional attention, since there are several countries that have good records on corruption and bad records on human rights, and vice versa. But in any one year, the list of such outlier countries may well differ and further analysis may want to include internal conflict as an additional explanatory variable (see, e.g. Poe and Tate 1994).

37. The multivariate analysis, however, weakened the support for this hypothesis in some degree. First, not all the measures of corruption were significantly related to human rights protection. Transparency International's CPI is not significant across the different models. In fairness, Transparency International has argued that the nature of the coding precludes time-series analysis even though other studies such as this have used it in this way. Second, variables other than corruption were also significantly related to human rights protection, suggesting that any policy prescriptions should include these factors alongside corruption as targets for a reform agenda.

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38. In particular, the results of our analysis suggest that promoting democracy and economic development alongside a reduction in corruption seems a sensible package of activities to improve the overall human rights situation. The extant literature on human rights that utilises this method of comparison has confirmed the importance of economic development and democracy for human rights as has been demonstrated in the analysis presented here (see Landman 2005a for a review). Moreover, the work on democratization both at a global level (e.g. Zanger 2000b) and a regional level in Latin America (e.g. Foweraker and Landman 1997) and Africa (e.g. Lindberg 2006) that initial democratization has tangible benefits for the protection of human rights. But beyond efforts at initial democratization, strengthening the mechanisms for horizontal accountability such as the independence of judiciaries, oversight authority and capacity of legislative assemblies and greater transparency of decision making will contribute to an improvement in human rights protection since perpetrators can no longer hide behind dysfunctional institutions. Long term cultural change, however, is much harder to instil as sedimented practices over time have become institutionalised and reified to such a degree that corruption becomes an acceptable form of 'doing politics' and human rights violations continue with impunity.

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