

East Asia and the Pacific

Australia, China, Fiji, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, Taiwan, and other Pacific island states

By Rowan Callick

Introduction

The East Asia and Pacific region contains the world's largest and smallest countries, ranging from the People's Republic of China to the island state of Nauru. Australia, Hong Kong and New Zealand have grappled with corruption for decades, devising effective strategies to contain it, while South Korea and Japan show clear signs of wanting to follow suit. But China and Papua New Guinea have an immense task ahead. Though both have recently introduced anti-corruption measures, making them work may involve confrontation with influential sectors of the body politic.

In the first decades after World War II, the focus of public attention was overwhelmingly on political development, as independence struggles, the divisions of the Cold War, and the emergence of new elites and institutions took their course. The thrust of the last 20 years has been more on economic change, with aid and foreign investment reinforcing the pursuit of ever faster growth.

After the financial crash of the late 1990s, attention is again firmly fixed on the need to address political reform, in part because of a valid popular perception that the economic crisis was spurred by failed governance and excessive cronyism, and that public and private corruption are hindering economic recovery. As the 21st century begins, a consensus is developing across much of the region that there is no serious alternative to democracy. As the Asian middle classes grow ever larger, the rule of law and meritocracy are increasingly viewed as more likely than cronyism and feudalism to bring stability in the longer term.

The Asian economic crisis also focused attention on the volatility of foreign investment. Foreign investors are frequently blamed for a fickleness that fostered corruption, which is now widely viewed within the region as having contributed to the crisis. Previously, investors looked favourably on the region's 'stable' – often undemocratic and corrupt – regimes. Afterwards, the international investment community railed against the 'moral hazard' that this fostered.

But despite the ‘wake-up call’ from the crisis, ‘the perception is that corruption clearly remains a serious problem in most countries’ in Asia, according to Hong Kong’s Political and Economic Risk Consultancy.¹ The companies that suffered most from the economic downturn were those that depended most on corrupt arrangements, rather than open competition. Many of those companies have since been resurrected, in part through international support for the region’s economies. The ascendancy of *guanxi* (Chinese for ‘special connections’) over skills and sound business plans has never been stronger, though significant changes are taking place, for instance in Japan and South Korea.

News review

China faces the region’s greatest challenge in reining back corruption. While corruption is far from a new phenomenon, economic transition has presented new opportunities. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter economist Andy Xie estimated the cost of corruption to China’s economy at 2–3 per cent of the country’s GDP.² But Professor Hu Angang of Tsinghua University, Beijing, put the cost as high as 13–16 per cent of GDP, and estimated that 15–20 per cent of public project funds ‘leak’ into private hands.³ Cases of corruption received more attention than ever in the Chinese media in 2000: the number of accusations investigated in the year numbered 45,000, a 15 per cent increase from 1999.⁴

China’s senior officials acknowledge the extent of the challenge facing them. Annual meetings of the National People’s Congress are the scene of frank admissions of the distortions caused by corruption to the economy, to the social fabric and to the credibility of the Communist Party. On 9 March 2001, Li Peng, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, warned: ‘Historical experience has proved that the exercise of power without restraint and supervision inevitably leads to corruption. We face the destruction of our party and of our nation if we fail to fight corruption and promote clean government.’⁵

The Chinese government’s move to de-link the military and police from their considerable past business involvement gives confidence that progress can be made in such areas. The government has also begun to streamline the approval process for business activities, in part to reduce corruption, in part because of its need to raise funds. And to combat corruption in building the ambitious Qinghai-Tibet railway, China’s vice minister of railways announced a process of public bidding for the contract – an example of the recent shift towards market mechanisms in project approvals and administration.⁶ China’s stepped-up ‘strike hard’ anti-crime campaign of 2000–01, which included the execution of a number of senior officials over corruption, was criticised by human rights activists for its infringe-

ment of civil liberties. Those executed included former National People's Congress vice-chairman Cheng Kejie, convicted of embezzling 41 million yuan (US \$5 million), and the former deputy governor of Jiangxi province, Hu Changqing, convicted for accepting 5 million yuan (US \$650,000) in bribes.⁷

Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption is widely viewed as a model of toughness and what can be achieved given sufficient resources. In 2000 it received 4,390 corruption reports, of which 3,140 were considered pursuable, up by 23 per cent on 1999. There were 602 reports against the police, up 19 per cent, and 2,402 reports against corruption in the private sector, up by 26 per cent. Commissioner Alan Lai argued that the Asian economic collapse of 1997–99 'exposed some graft-facilitated frauds that took place when the economy was going well'.⁸

In March 2000, in Taiwan, a president was elected for the first time from outside the Kuomintang (KMT) party that dominated the island's politics from 1949 to the 1990s (with martial rule continuing until 1987). President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party campaigned against 'black gold' politics: the involvement of organised crime in political life. Lien Chan, the new KMT leader said: 'KMT today is quite different from KMT yesterday.'⁹ Part of its US \$2 billion assets have been placed in a blind trust in an attempt to make the party more



Ban-Bu-Pae (Against Corruption)
Si-Beck Park, South Korea

transparent. Vote buying persists in Taiwan, but Chen's victory demonstrated that both the practice and its effect have waned. However, the fight against 'black gold' politics is a formidable challenge to the new government.

South Korea's Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs revealed in early 2001 that it knew of 8,200 officials who had accepted bribes. But provincial government officials warned that an excess of zeal in the anti-corruption campaign risked charges of political persecution during the 2002 elections.¹⁰ The intimate entanglement of *chaebols* (conglomerates) with successive governments and leading politicians in South Korea is regarded by many as dangerous and corruptly collusive. Their domination by single families in the past reinforced their control of the markets in which they operated and of government procurement business. The collapse of Daewoo, the second biggest *chaebol*, with debts of US \$80 billion, sent shock waves through Korea just as many thought recovery had begun to consolidate. The bankruptcy raised questions about auditing – an auditor faced criminal charges for the first time in South Korean history – and the efficacy of the new Financial Supervisory Commission. It also brought concern about the failure of the banks and trusts that had kept the company afloat to provide any earlier warning. Attention focused on the extent of alleged bribery on the part of group founder and former chairman Kim Woo-Chong, who became a fugitive shortly before the company's final failure.¹¹

North Korea has one of the least transparent government structures in the world. It nevertheless laid itself open to a degree of accountability by accepting UN aid to counter its continuing famine, and by starting to accept modest investment, chiefly from South Korea. Aid workers complained of difficulties in monitoring programmes; they simply could not tell if supplies reached their intended destination.¹² Mark Galeotti, Director of the Organised Russian and Eurasian Crime Research Unit at Keele University in the UK, warned of 'the economic links between the two Koreas broadening the opportunities for personal corruption'.¹³

Japan's ten-year economic crisis fostered a succession of allegations of corruption and of electoral campaign finance scandals. Three cabinet ministers were forced to resign from the 2000–01 Yoshiro Mori government, including Fukushima Nukaga – State Minister of Economic and Fiscal Policy – who admitted that he received bribes to influence government decisions from insurance company KSD.¹⁴ A Foreign Ministry report in early 2001 revealed the existence of hitherto secret 'discretionary funds' used by prime ministers and officials for overseas trips and for other activities, including espionage.¹⁵ This behaviour was widely viewed as corrupt inside Japan, and its revelation in an official document indicated the emergence of new attitudes to transparency and accountability. Labour Minister Masakuni Murakami, one of the 'Gang of Five' who selected Yoshiro Mori as Prime

Minister, was arrested in March 2001 on charges of bribery, an indication of the growing zeal of police and prosecutors to pursue even the most powerful in Japanese politics.¹⁶ In April 2001, Junichiro Koizumi became Japan's new Prime Minister. At first an outsider in the race within the Liberal Democratic Party to replace Mori, he defeated the party's established hierarchy, pledging to reinvigorate political and economic reform in Japan – and received unprecedented public support.

Australia's federal criminal code was amended to include a new chapter, the Proper Administration of Government, that covers theft, fraud, bribery and related offences, with new penalties of up to ten years' imprisonment for bribery. The amendment came into effect in May 2001. New Zealand still enjoys a low perception of domestic corruption though, as in Australia, attention to the issue was increased by the international cricket bribery scandal. The Indian Central Bureau of Investigation named the former captain of the New Zealand cricket team, Martin Crowe, as having contact with a bookmaker.¹⁷

Papua New Guinea's (PNG) Prime Minister Sir Mekere Morauta is widely perceived to be at the forefront of a tough battle against entrenched corruption. In 2001 the PNG police fraud squad began investigating four provincial governments over allegations of corruption.¹⁸

Developing institutions to combat corruption

Increasing numbers of countries in the Asia-Pacific region have introduced or reinforced high-profile independent anti-corruption agencies, as they have discovered that diverting existing institutions in this direction often achieves little. In the wake of the economic crises of the late 1990s, the increased exposure given to the economic and social problems caused by corruption has accelerated decisions in favour of a pro-active stance. The success of one-off inquiries has tended to be an interim route in that process. Older anti-corruption agencies, such as those in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Australian state of New South Wales, have become working models of the institutions that NGOs and the private sector want to see replicated in their own countries.¹⁹ Such models are being increasingly considered as options in South Korea, Japan, PNG, Vanuatu, and in a number of other Australian states, but the economic and political costs are a major deterrent. The spread of anti-corruption agencies has therefore been slow. China has not followed these models, but the Communist Party's Central Discipline and Inspection Commission, though it lacks transparency and operates in an uncertain judicial environment, has become a feared anti-corruption agency.²⁰

The institution of the ombudsman is not new in the region: New Zealand introduced the institution as early as 1962. In recent years, ombudsmen in PNG,

Fiji and Vanuatu have produced sensational reports and come under political fire as they have become more pro-active in investigating corruption. Ombudsmen maintain a difficult balance between their oversight role and more dramatic investigative work. Vanuatu's first Ombudsman failed to be reappointed by the President after a series of hard-hitting reports.²¹

The wide variation in the strength of institutions across the region and their different capacities in the fight against corruption are visible even between the Pacific island states, which were pulled in very different political directions in 2000–01. In PNG, Mekere Morauta, Prime Minister since 1999, initiated a range of efforts against the country's deeply entrenched corruption. Reforms included legislation to enhance the independence of the central bank; the 'revitalisation' of watchdog institutions such as the Ombudsman Commission, Auditor General and Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee; legislation on the integrity of political parties; and the establishment of a judicial inquiry into the collapse of the National Provident Fund.²² By contrast, in the Solomon Islands institutional development has been very tentative. Morale has been depressed by the extent of the environmental, social and economic damage caused by Southeast Asian loggers, who have become enmeshed with the governing elite.²³ Following a coup in mid-2000, the country has effectively been in the hands of ethnic militias.

Ethics in the public service and beyond

There is a growing perception in East Asia and the Pacific that public services are failing to shield people from corruption, particularly in a period that has seen bureaucracies and budgets reduced in size. The quality of public service varies enormously within countries and between them. In Australia, Hong Kong and New Zealand, a high level of professionalism prevails at the national and provincial level and standards of ethics are high. But elements of China's public service are notorious for their susceptibility to petty corruption, reflecting low pay levels, although the government is seeking to redress this in the face of burgeoning wage growth in the private sector.

A number of countries have seen both public and private sector reforms. New 'whistleblower' legislation – the Protected Disclosures Act – took effect in New Zealand on 1 January 2001 and ostensibly protects employees who notify the authorities of corruption from civil, criminal or disciplinary proceedings, and retaliatory action by their employer.

In Japan, a belated shift towards a stronger sense of public service was signalled by the Cabinet's appointment of a board to administer the National Public Service Ethics Law of 1999. This law requires that fair treatment be given to all members of the public and distinguishes between public and private dealings.

New party law in Papua New Guinea

The Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Act, passed unanimously on 7 December 2000, offers hope that elected governments in Papua New Guinea (PNG) will finally come to fulfil their national mandates. The law aims to end the criss-crossing of the parliamentary floor by MPs that has hampered PNG's political development.

The Act is intended to develop and nurture political parties that, despite 25 years of independence, have failed to supplant traditional alliances. Political parties have not yet developed to the point where they offer alternative platforms and policies to the voting public. Instead, individual candidates offer material benefits, such as food and drinks, and promises of future rewards, in return for votes from their constituencies.

Politicians in PNG often run as independents – more than half did in the last election – or join political parties as a matter of convenience only after winning their seats. The constantly shifting alliances that characterise political life in post-independence PNG have led to rampant corruption.

The majority of members of parliament, often elected with as little as ten per cent of the vote, are rarely re-elected. They tend to see their term in office as an opportunity to advance their personal fortune at the expense of the national interest.

The Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates Act is intended to change that pattern by nurturing political parties. It requires all parties to be registered and provides state

funding to candidates who belong to them.

It is hoped that this will minimise the need of members of parliament to raise money from unscrupulous sources seeking political favours. The law also ensures accountability by requiring parties and candidates to declare to the public who their members are, where they get their money from and how they spend it.

The new law discourages politicians from running as independent candidates by restricting their voting rights on votes of no confidence, the budget and constitutional amendments. This clause is intended to prevent independents from threatening to join the opposition ranks and bringing down the government if they do not get what they want.

While the rights of independent candidates have been limited, the rights of women candidates have been expanded. The Act does not set aside seats specifically for women, as some women had wanted, but it does include incentives to encourage women to run for office. Registered parties that endorse a female candidate will be reimbursed for expenses incurred in her campaign if she secures at least ten per cent of the vote in her constituency.

Hopes are high that the Integrity Law will make a real difference to PNG's political evolution, but the challenge lies in its implementation. If applied in the spirit in which it was intended, the law offers the possibility of meaningful democratic change. But if it is subverted by political self-interest, democracy in PNG will continue to be undermined.

TI-Papua New Guinea

State employees now require approval before giving a speech or making a TV appearance for which payment by an 'interested party' has been promised.²⁴

Such measures help to raise the standards of public service behaviour, but the real challenge requires the creation of more robust anti-corruption agencies. Endowing such agencies with powers of criminal prosecution would allow them to benefit from police-level cooperation at an international level.

International pressure for change

The widespread acceptance of globalisation as a force for progress and improved living standards has encouraged international and regional bodies to take an active role in guiding patterns of governance. This has increasingly included making funding conditional on improved standards. International pressure is encouraging countries to develop appropriate institutions for combating corruption as an indication of their determination to take the issue seriously.

International pressure for better governance gained critical leverage from the need of ailing Asian economies for increased external capital inflows. South Korea received a massive support programme initiated by the IMF, following the 1997 downturn. The conditionalities demanded by lenders led in turn to increased deregulation of domestic markets, diversified ownership of business and enhanced accountability through a higher status accorded to shareholders. Pacific Island finance largely flows through official aid channels that increasingly arrive with attached conditions of better governance. For the Australian government, the largest donor in the islands region, this is a major element in aid decisions.

Among the conditions attached to packages coordinated by international financial institutions, anti-corruption measures tend to attract most public support. Inevitably they also risk antagonising governments that resent being treated as corrupt, and the concomitant 'invasion' of their sovereignty. The PNG government, currently implementing a structural adjustment programme, asked the World Bank in February 2001 to remove its coordinator from Port Moresby, the capital. Concern was expressed in the private sector that this request was in part due to World Bank pressure for anti-corruption conditions, although the government denied this.²⁵

China's accession to the World Trade Organisation, expected to be completed by the end of 2001, was viewed as a crucial opportunity to harness the country's economic dynamism to a rules-based structure. Modernising planners in China and representatives of the international investment community regard this as more likely to improve governance than any single domestic factor.

At its second annual meeting in Seoul in December 2000, the Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, led by the ADB and the OECD, endorsed the concept of an 'anti-corruption compact' for regional cooperation. The compact is being formulated for submission at the next annual meeting of the Anti-Corruption Initiative in Tokyo in November 2001. The draft compact highlights the roles that governments, the private sector and civil society can play.

As members of the OECD, Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand have all signed the Anti-Bribery Convention. New Zealand ratified the Convention in June 2001. Japan was one of the first countries to ratify the Convention, imple-

menting it through an amendment to its Unfair Competition Prevention Law which came into force in February 1999. However, an OECD Working Group review of Japan in October 1999 argued that a 'major loophole' remained.²⁶ In response, the government eventually adopted amending legislation in June 2001.

In the Pacific, the OECD put pressure on the Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu to strengthen their anti-money laundering mechanisms and threatened sanctions if performance was not improved.²⁷

With around 10,500 inhabitants, the Micronesian island nation of Nauru for a few

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years claimed the highest per capita income in the world from phosphate mining and its 400 offshore banks. The US Department of State said the Russian mafia was laundering billions of dollars through Nauru's banks.²⁸

The Pacific Islands Forum is beginning to support improved governance among its 16 members, who comprise most of the island nations, along with Australia and New Zealand. In October 2000, the Forum approved rules including 'the inalienable

right to participate by means of a free and democratic political process'. Members formerly refused to countenance intervention in their domestic affairs. The new declaration – driven by shock at the attempted coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands – committed Forum nations to good governance, and established an action plan to respond to future crises.²⁹

Bilateral commercial bodies play an important role in boosting mutual trade and investment. Increasingly, they have begun to raise issues that hamper this, including corruption. The Australia-PNG Business Council said in February 2001 that, in spite of its general approval of the Morauta government's reforms, 'business groups are despondent about PNG's feeble response to the endemic corruption that is clogging the wheels of the administration and the judiciary. Few if any of the perpetrators face punishment.'³⁰

Growing internationalisation has also had an impact on various professions, with central bankers meeting frequently to compare notes on threats to governance, and judges increasingly sitting on courts of appeal in neighbouring countries in a bid to enhance impartiality. Most Pacific Islands courts use the services of foreign judges. A Pacific Legal Network was formed in early 2001 comprising private law firms in different island jurisdictions cooperating on cases.³¹

Civil society targets corruption

Civil society is strongest in the oldest democracies, Australia and New Zealand, but is also taking firm root in South Korea, which has a tradition of stubborn trade unions and feisty student activists, and Taiwan, whose environmental activists are among the most effective in Asia. Civil society is less robust in Japan and Hong Kong. In China the government maintains the right to control all significant institutions in the country, including 'NGOs' and the media. In the Pacific Islands, civil society is growing in strength as disillusionment grows with political elites.

Where progress towards establishing independent anti-corruption agencies is slow, it is the institutions of civil society that can do most to fill the gap. But civil society groups face constraints in responding to corruption, including a lack of the resources required to conduct investigations that can be sustained in court, and a fear of alienating politicians or political parties.

Years of lobbying by civil society groups in Japan resulted in an Information Disclosure Law that came into effect on 1 April 2001 and which could have a large impact on the ability of civil society to hold public officials to account. During the 1980s and 1990s NGOs lobbied for information disclosure ordinances at local government level, achieving them in many administrations. Under the new law, the national administration must also become more transparent. Civil society groups such as Information Clearinghouse Japan and the Freedom of Information Citizen Centre work to help citizens make use of this new law. However, limitations remain. Officials enjoy considerable discretion in deciding which documents fall into 'exempt' categories, and the law does not apply to *tokushu hojin* (public corporations), though draft legislation has been submitted to address this.³²

The two major NGO associations in South Korea, the Korea Council of Citizens Movement, with 65 civic groups, and Reform Solidarity, with another 100 groups, agreed in early 2001 to campaign together on a range of issues of which corruption is central. And in January 2001 a group of 23 young legislators formed the Lawmakers' Council for Political Reform, which aims in part to promote more effective legislation against corruption.³³

In response to popular anger about corruption in China, the authorities have taken tough action, resulting in arrests and convictions. However, this approach could backfire politically if corruption is perceived still to be growing.

In PNG, talkback radio has become a focus for popular discontent, especially concerning corruption and environmental abuses, and the morning shows of Roger Hau'ofa are regularly listened to in business and government offices. Further cases of corruption in public life such as the issuance of false passports and a visa racket were brought to light in the year 2000 by the PNG media.³⁴

Civic groups in Fiji, most prominently the Citizens' Constitutional Forum, have emerged to play a significant watchdog role on corruption issues as part of a broader brief to defend human rights and democratic institutions. As a result of their pressure and that of the courts, elections in Fiji were brought forward to August 2001.

In Hong Kong, extensive media coverage of major ICAC cases is encouraging more people to come forward and inform about corruption. The ICAC said in its annual report for 2000, 'the private sector has demonstrated less tolerance towards corruption as evident in the rising numbers (188 in the year 2000) of management referrals'. And 70 per cent of total complaints were not anonymous, greatly enhancing follow-up capacity.³⁵

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Members of the private sector are reluctant in many countries to take a more prominent role in anti-corruption activities, out of concern that they could attract the criticism of their peer groups for inviting regulation. However, NGOs are having some influence on the private sector. The Minerals Council of Australia, for example, introduced a framework for improvements in the governance of companies operating overseas. The code, which the Council wants its members to sign, would result in public scrutiny through a compulsory reporting process reviewed by a new independent advisory group.³⁶ This code results in part from NGO campaigns on the activities of mining houses overseas.

Conclusion

While corruption remains a severe problem in many countries in East Asia and the Pacific, recent reforms have led to a number of new institutions and processes to fight it. The lessons from Hong Kong and Australia's state of New South Wales are that the fight against corruption can be effective when institutions focus exclusively on corruption and have the authority to pursue criminal prosecutions. The trend towards stronger anti-corruption bodies coincides with civil society demands for change.

Greater public concern about the effects of corruption is a clear trend across the region. As non-executive parts of government grow in authority and accountability and non-governmental forces emerge, there is a new counterweight demanding an end to corruption in a number of East Asian and Pacific societies. The details differ from country to country. In some, civil society remains weakly organised and, especially in China, constrained by the state. Public attention to

corruption relates to the dislocation between the high expectations of constant rising living standards and the negative impact of the economic slowdown in the wake of the Asian economic crisis of 1997–99.³⁷ Another reason for increased public concern is the rapid growth of new media, multiplying the spread of information – and rumours – about the state of national corruption.

International cooperation in the fight against corruption is growing, and it may bring significant change to the region. Institutions, including the World Bank, the OECD and the ADB, now tie anti-corruption efforts to their loan activities. The importance of good governance has been stressed in the new Cotonou Agreement, which underpins relations between the EU and the Pacific island states. And in response to coup attempts in the Solomon Islands and Fiji, the Pacific Islands Forum firmly committed its member states to the promotion of democracy and good governance.

As East Asian countries begin again the process of launching fresh rounds of investment and trading overseas, it is important that their businesses take with them the lessons of improved governance at home, and do not adopt, as too often in the past, the view that abroad ‘anything goes’.

- 1 Agence France Presse, 19 March 2001.
- 2 Interview with author.
- 3 *Asian Wall Street Journal* (Singapore), 8 March 2001.
- 4 Figure reported by the Prosecutor General's Office to the National People's Congress (China's parliament) in March 2001. *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), 19 March 2001.
- 5 Xinhua News Agency (China), 10 March 2001.
- 6 Xinhua News Agency (China), 10 March 2001.
- 7 Associated Press, 14 September 2000; Reuters, 7 May 2000.
- 8 Independent Commission Against Corruption, press release on the *ICAC 2000 Annual Report*, 23 February 2001.
- 9 Reuters, 19 March 2001.
- 10 *Korea Times* (Korea), 7 February 2001.
- 11 Economist Intelligence Unit (UK), 8 March 2001.
- 12 *The Australian* (Australia), 20 November 2000.
- 13 *Jane's Intelligence Review* (UK), March 2001
- 14 Forbes.com, 23 January 2001.
- 15 *Kyodo News* (Japan), 18 March 2001.
- 16 *Asia Intelligence Wire* (UK), 6 March 2001.
- 17 *Pakistan Press International* (Pakistan), 2 November 2000.
- 18 *The National* (PNG), 15 February 2001.
- 19 For more on Singapore, see the regional report on Southeast Asia, p. 23.
- 20 Economist Intelligence Unit, Business China, 12 March 2001.
- 21 Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Pacific Islands: Fiji, New Caledonia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu,' October 2000.
- 22 PNG Prime Minister Mekere Morauta, speech to the Institute of Directors, 1 March 2001.
- 23 *Sydney Morning Herald* (Australia), 3 March 2001. For more on logging in Southeast Asia, see p. 26.
- 24 *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), 6 September 2000.
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- 34 *The National* (PNG), 8 June 2001.
- 35 Independent Commission against Corruption, *ICAC 2000 Annual Report* (Hong Kong: ICAC, 2001): <<http://www.icac.org.hk/eng/public/index.html>>.
- 36 Author's interview with the Executive Director of Minerals Council of Australia.
- 37 Minister Byoung-Woo Ahn, Office of the Prime Minister, South Korea, in an address to the Seoul Conference on Combating Corruption in the Asia-Pacific Region, 11–13 December 2000.