Anti-Corruption Assessment Tool for Parliamentarians

User guide
Acknowledgements:
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Corruption is undeniably one of the most serious impediments to human development. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes quality of life, and allows organised crime, terrorism, and other threats to human security to flourish. Corruption hinders efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), by obstructing unfettered public access to social services and diverting resources away from investments in public infrastructure, public institutions and social services.\(^1\) Although it affects all social classes and all groups, the effects of corruption are most severe for women, the poor, and marginalized parts of the population.\(^2\)

Each year, corruption diverts more than 5 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP).\(^3\) Money laundering is the world’s third-largest business, worth about US$500 billion a year.\(^4\) The tremendous growth in the global dialogue on corruption over the past two decades is a result of greater awareness of these negative consequences. Fighting corruption is now at the forefront of citizens’ demands and is a key topic in national global development discourses, including in consultations on the post-2015 development agenda.

The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) has achieved near universal ratification\(^5\) and has created a global momentum in support of the fight against corruption. UNCAC is the first legally binding global instrument against corruption that provides States parties with a set of standards, measures and rules that they can and must apply in their respective countries. The UNCAC review processes encourage multistakeholder engagement at the national level, but participation of stakeholders such as civil society and parliamentarians is optional.

The Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) recognize that parliamentarians play a critical role in UNCAC implementation. While it is the executive branches of governments that sign UNCAC, it is countries’ parliaments that are responsible for enacting legislation necessary to meet treaty obligations. Once a national anti-corruption authority is established, it is national parliaments that must monitor the authority and the implementation of anti-corruption laws. Using their oversight powers, parliaments must be diligent in ensuring that sufficient resources are allocated to ensure adequate implementation of UNCAC. The Convention includes provisions for member States to report their progress to the international community, and for the international community to share in the monitoring of States’ progress. Parliaments should play a robust role in this reporting and monitoring cycle.

UNDP and GOPAC produced the *Anti-Corruption Assessment Tool for Parliamentarians* to support their vital role in the UNCAC system. The tool was jointly and successfully tested in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco and Timor-Leste. It is specially designed for parliamentarians and focuses on their role in ensuring effective UNCAC implementation.

We would like to highlight two aspects of the tool.
Firstly, there are many international indices ranking governments and parliaments in the world, but this tool is not one of them. Rather, our aim is to help parliamentarians evaluate their own effectiveness in combating corruption in their own countries. Although this is a self-assessment tool, undertaking an assessment with other actors (governmental and non-governmental) would add immeasurably to the tool’s effectiveness by augmenting sound evidence to substantiate its ratings. This can help parliamentarians improve national knowledge on what policies to create, and what actions to take.

Secondly, this is the first assessment tool with a special focus on the role of parliamentarians in the fight against corruption, and more specifically on Chapter II of UNCAC (on the prevention of corruption). We hope that this tool will serve as an important catalyst for dialogue, national consultations and policy reforms, particularly with respect to preventive measures such as the implementation of national anti-corruption strategies and the strengthening of national anti-corruption agencies.

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Section 1. Introduction

This introduction explains how the Anti-Corruption Assessment Tool for Parliamentarians relates to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), and how it can help parliaments in their efforts to prevent and minimise corruption. It is appropriate for use by any parliament, whether long-standing or more recently established, and in countries that use either a parliamentary or presidential system. This tool can also be used by representatives or assembly members at the sub-national level to enhance their understanding on UNCAC and anti-corruption.

A. What is the UN Convention Against Corruption?

UNCAC, which is the first legally binding universal anti-corruption instrument, is the most comprehensive international treaty to prevent and combat corruption. It came into force in December 2005, and has been ratified or acceded to by 168 States (as of 8 October 2013).\(^6\) It exists alongside a number of regional anti-corruption conventions, such as the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, to name just a few.

Corruption, defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain, has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies because it hinders economic growth and development, undermines democracy and the rule of law, violates rights and distorts markets.\(^7\) In his foreword to

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\(^6\) Information about countries’ status in terms of signature/ratification of UNCAC may be found at the following website: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.

\(^7\) UNDP (2008). Anti-Corruption Practice Note.
UNCAC, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan points out that although corruption is present in all countries, it is in the developing world that its effects are most destructive. It hurts the poor disproportionately, and is a major obstacle to economic development and poverty alleviation. In the effort to combat corruption the Convention commits signatory States to a detailed set of measures under four main headings: steps to prevent corruption, criminalisation and law enforcement, international cooperation and the recovery of assets. Through these measures the Convention seeks to promote integrity and strengthen international cooperation in combating corruption, accountability and proper management in both public and private sectors.

**What are States Parties to the Convention required to do?**

States parties to UNCAC are required to align their anti-corruption policies, procedures and legislation with the measures prescribed in its articles, subject to the principles of their own legal systems where appropriate. Five main areas for State action in line with the Convention are correspondingly defined in five chapters of the instrument: prevention measures (Chapter II), criminalization and law enforcement measures (Chapter III), international cooperation (Chapter IV), asset recovery (Chapter V) and technical assistance and information exchange (Chapter VI). These chapters include both mandatory and non-mandatory provisions.

**The review mechanism**

A review mechanism for the implementation of UNCAC was established by the third session of the Conference of the States Parties (CoSP) to the Convention in Doha in November 2009. Under this scheme, States parties to the Convention committed to a peer review process to evaluate implementation of UNCAC provisions. The mechanism specifies that each State party will review, and be reviewed by its peers, once every five years. The identification of reviewing and to-be-reviewed States is determined by the random drawing of lots held at the meeting of the Implementation Review Group (IRG). The first review cycle, which started in 2010 and will end in 2014, will cover Chapters III and IV of the Convention (criminalization and law enforcement, and international cooperation). The total number of States under review was 27 for the first year, 41 for the second year, and 35 for the third year. The remaining countries (approximately 64) will be reviewed in the fourth year. The second review cycle, which will start in 2014, will review the remaining two chapters: Chapter II (prevention measures) and Chapter V (asset recovery).

The 3rd CoSP also endorsed the comprehensive UNCAC self-assessment checklist as the tool to be used by all States parties as the first step of the review process to gather information under the review mechanism. The checklist aims to ensure that comprehensive and reliable data are collected on national efforts to implement the Convention. It is a computer-based system that helps States parties identify gaps so that technical assistance needs can be identified and measures can be taken to improve their compliance. In addition to being a core component of the overall review process, the checklist can also be conducted independently in advance of a review to provide an independent assessment of a country’s anti-corruption infrastructure.

The terms of reference (TOR) of the review mechanism mention that the country review reports shall remain confidential. They also encourage member States to involve all stakeholders (both governmental and non-governmental), to help develop a national anti-corruption strategy and to monitor progress towards that strategy’s effective implementation. State parties are also encouraged to share the findings of the checklist and of the review process with the public, with a minimum requirement being that the executive summaries of these reports are made publicly accessible.

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8 What are States Parties to the Convention required to do?
11 Mechanism for the review of implementation of UNCAC—Basic Documents.
As Secretariat to the CoSP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNoDC) has been undertaking training activities to familiarize States parties with the methodology of the review process. UNDP, building on its existing work on governance, is also working with UNoDC and GOPAC to provide training to both governmental and non-governmental experts to strengthen the knowledge base on UNCAC implementation and review. The collaborative work also seeks to utilize the UNCAC review process as an opportunity to expand the scope of governance and anti-corruption reforms. UNDP developed a guidance note on UNCAC self-assessments to serve as a step-by-step guide for conducting an inclusive and participatory review of the Convention using the self-assessment checklist.\textsuperscript{12}

B. What is the role of a parliament in the implementation of the Convention?

*Parliaments and parliamentarians have a key role to play in combating corruption and in the different processes envisaged under UNCAC.*

In the broadest terms they have responsibility for the quality and effectiveness of legislation; for approving the national budget and all government revenues and expenditure; for the effective oversight of the executive; and for representing the interests and views of constituents and non-governmental actors in the framing of national policy. All these distinctive functions of a parliament are relevant in the fight against corruption and can be brought to bear to make anti-corruption efforts more effective. In particular parliaments and parliamentarians can:

- play an active role in the design and implementation of a national anti-corruption strategy, the establishment and strengthening of relevant national anti-corruption body/bodies, and in framing and reviewing relevant legislation;
- promote UNCAC and play an important oversight role in the monitoring and review of national efforts to implement and domesticate the Convention (including by identifying gaps in the implementation of its provisions);
- collaborate with the executive in strengthening anti-corruption policies and procedures; and
- assist in developing coalitions of civil society organisations and other stakeholders to support full compliance with UNCAC.

C. What is the value of a self-assessment toolkit for parliamentarians?

*Why develop a self-assessment toolkit for parliamentarians?*

There are many instruments developed by international bodies to assess the effectiveness of parliaments and help improve their performance. This tool developed by UNDP and GOPAC focuses on the role of parliaments in combating corruption in general, and in assisting in a country’s compliance with UNCAC more specifically. It comprises a series of questions or checklists, answers to which serve to identify gaps in the effectiveness of a parliament’s contribution to the implementation of the Convention. By identifying the most serious gaps, plans can be put in place to strengthen a parliament’s anti-corruption procedures with targeted improvements in legislation, executive oversight, budgetary control and the protection of standards of conduct in public life, as the case may require. The assessment can also be used:

- as a *benchmark*, against which future progress can be measured;
- as a basis for *dialogue* with the executive;
- as an instrument for *mobilising* public opinion and non-governmental actors behind an anti-corruption strategy; and
- as a means for *identifying priorities* for external support and expertise, as well as international cooperation.

The assessment tool is not intended as a device for ranking parliaments, but for evaluating an individual parliament’s effectiveness in helping combat corruption.

\textsuperscript{12} The guidance note is available at: www.u4.no/recommended-reading/guidance-note-uncac-self-assessments-going-beyond-the-minimum.pdf.
**What issues does the self-assessment tool cover?**

The self-assessment tool primarily covers the articles of Chapter II of UNCAC, which focus on preventing corruption. Prevention in this regard is considered in a broad manner to include not only preventive measures against corruption, but also the enactment of criminal legislation as a deterrent to corruption. In four main sections, the tool deals in turn with a parliament’s role in:

1. *anti-corruption planning and monitoring*, including cooperation with the main anti-corruption body or bodies and questioning the executive on corruption-related issues and reports;

2. *financial oversight*, including the authorisation of all revenues and expenditures; the composition and effectiveness of the parliament’s budget oversight committee; monitoring resource extraction and revenues; the oversight of executive financial instruments and the use of contingency funds; monitoring of the independent audit institution and its reports; the parliament’s capacity for financial analysis and control over its own budget; the prevention of money-laundering;

3. *establishing and monitoring standards of conduct* for public officials, elected and non-elected; oversight of enforcement body or bodies; regulating conflicts of interest; ensuring the appropriateness of rules on parliamentary immunity; and

4. *ensuring parliamentary accessibility* and availability of information for interested publics—including constituents, civil society organisations and journalists—both on corruption-related issues and more generally.
2. Using the self-assessment tool

A. When might the toolkit be used?

The most obvious point of entry for initiating use of the self-assessment tool is when the government is required to report on its compliance with UNCAC, and is undertaking its own assessment to identify possible gaps in implementation. Parliamentarians should insist on being involved in this review process, not least because they will be expected to endorse any measures of policy, legislation or expenditure that may arise from implementing the review’s findings. One way of contributing to the national review would be to use the toolkit to conduct their own assessment of the effectiveness of the parliament’s procedures in combating corruption. This could be seen as complementing the government’s own wider assessment, whether the parliamentarians’ assessment is undertaken as part of the Convention review process or in advance of it.

A different point of entry for using the toolkit could be at a time when issues of corruption have become the centre of public and media attention in the country, whether directly affecting parliamentarians or not. The use of the assessment tool could be seen as a way for a parliament to show that it is taking a lead in anti-corruption efforts by examining its own effectiveness. Doing so in a frank and open manner could help restore or enhance public confidence in the institution as a whole.

A further point of entry could be when a parliament is engaged in the process of identifying needs for development or technical assistance, for example with an external partner. In such a case, the self-assessment tool could be used to identify key aspects of a parliament that need strengthening. Although anti-corruption efforts are only one specific element of a parliament’s work, many of the issues involved relate to the institution’s broader functions, including oversight of the budget, financial capacity, independence from the executive and oversight of independent public agencies. A parliament’s contribution to an anti-corruption strategy could thus serve as a litmus test of its effectiveness in general.
B. Who should take part in an assessment?

Since this tool is an assessment of parliaments and is designed for parliamentarians, they form the natural constituency from whom members of an assessment team should be drawn. Three considerations are important in determining who is best placed to take part.

The first is to ensure that the participants have sufficient weight with their colleagues so that the findings of the assessment have the best chance of gaining support. Thus members might include the president/speaker of the parliament and/or his or her deputy. Or it might involve an existing parliamentary committee on corruption or standards in public life. Or it could be an ad hoc parliamentary group established for the purpose of the assessment from members who have a known record of interest in the subject.

A second consideration is that of representativeness. To ensure the acceptance of the assessment’s findings, it is important that all major groups in a parliament (e.g., from governing and opposition parties) be represented on it. While a variety of viewpoints may give rise to disagreement over the answers to some of the assessment questions or to proposals for action stemming from the findings, these differences can be openly raised and debated in the assessment process. Acknowledging and responding to such disagreements can help to ensure that the conclusions are not dismissed as being partisan.

A third consideration is that members should have sufficient expertise to answer the assessment questions. Most of the questions involve procedures and practices internal to a parliament, and therefore require a sound knowledge of these procedures and how they have worked in practice in the parliament’s recent history. The experience and collective memory of the parliamentarians involved are therefore crucial. Members of the parliamentary staff should have a key role here also, as well as (possibly) academic or other external experts on the country’s parliamentary procedures. Where questions involve groups or institutions outside a parliament, as a few of them do, members may wish to supplement their own expertise by taking evidence directly from such individuals.

A combination of weight, representativeness and expertise among an assessment group can help ensure that the findings of an assessment carry authority or legitimacy among colleagues, and that any recommendations arising from it are taken seriously.

C. How should the assessment tool be used?

The self-assessment tool comprises a series of questions grouped under the thematic headings already summarised: 1) anti-corruption planning and monitoring, 2) financial oversight, 3) establishing and monitoring standards of conduct, and 4) ensuring parliamentary accessibility. The questions, which were crafted by a group of parliamentarians specialising in anti-corruption procedures of parliaments, are all based on standards of good procedure and practice recommended in UNCAC articles. Does the parliament meet these or not? Assessors are invited to answer directly ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to each question in turn.

A short version of the toolkit contains only the questions, to provide a rapid overview of what is involved. The longer version comprises a more elaborate template, setting out suggested criteria which would justify ticking a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer respectively to each question. These criteria are to be taken for guidance only, and are in some instances the extremes of a spectrum. Even with their help a clear-cut answer may prove difficult or misleading, in which case a third box marked ‘partly’ can be ticked. The wide space that follows in the final column of the template provides room for an explanation of the answer that has been given, or to note any uncertainties or disagreements.

Some of the questions lend themselves more readily to a clear-cut ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. For example, under the questions about a parliamentary budget oversight or public accounts committee (questions numbered 2.5.1 through 2.5.7), the first three invite categorical answers: whether such a committee exists, who chairs it and what its composition is. All these are purely factual matters. The remainder of the questions—about the committee’s powers and its effectiveness—are more difficult to answer so categorically, and may require a more complex or nuanced response. In such instances, there may well be disagreements between different members of the assessment group, and it will be important to identify the reasons for the dissension.

Some disagreements may stem from a difference of perception between members of government and opposition parties. The roots of others may be associated with a gap between the formal powers and procedures available to a parliament and its committees, and the effectiveness or determination with which they are used in practice. It is not only a lack of adequate powers or procedures that may hamper a parliament’s effectiveness in combating corruption: also important in many contexts are obstacles to their use in practice, whether from inadequate resources or expertise, tight party discipline, a perception of low political priority, or other causes. Identifying such obstacles can make an important contribution to any assessment.

D. What sources of data are required?

Since this is an assessment tool directed towards parliamentarians, and concerns their own procedures and responsibilities in helping combat corruption, most of the evidence needed to answer the assessment questions lies within a parliament itself. Knowledge of the rulebook of parliamentary procedures and how a parliament works in practice therefore form the key resource for undertaking the assessment. This knowledge lies with senior parliamentarians, experienced parliamentary staff and external experts on the
national parliament; together, they are likely to be able to identify sources of evidence for questions of a more historical kind, for instance the number of examples over five years where parliamentary immunity has been invoked (questions 3.5.1 and 3.5.4).

A particularly valuable source of information is likely to be the clerk of the public accounts committee or equivalent, or the auditor-general or equivalent. Either or both of them may be a parliamentary officer or an external appointment. A number of questions (2.5.1 through 2.5.7, and 2.10.1 through 2.10.3) relate directly to such individuals' activities, and they may be able to assist in answering more general questions. In addition, clerks of other committees also may have knowledge relevant to other questions (for example, a treasury or budget committee for question 2.1.1), as may a senior parliamentary clerk (question 2.7.1).

**Other useful sources of information might include:**

- clerk of the committee or other body responsible for the maintenance of standards and privileges (questions 3.3.1 through 3.5.4);
- a parliamentary legal officer or advisor (questions 3.5.1 through 3.5.4);
- the office of the parliamentary president or speaker (question 3.5.4);
- a parliamentary communications office, if there is one; and
- a parliamentary library or research service, which might have valuable general knowledge and access to outside expertise.

**A small number of questions, however, require evidence from outside a parliament to answer.** Some information may be available from a country's anti-corruption commission or other relevant body, or from officials within the Ministry of Finance (questions 1.2.1 and 1.2.2, and questions 1.4.1 through 1.4.4). A few other questions concern perceptions of or involvement by the public (questions 4.1.1, 4.2.1 through 4.2.5, 4.3.2 and 4.3.4); to answer them, evidence needs to be accessed from constituents, civil society organisations and the media. In these few cases, an appropriate strategy would be to hold open hearings by the assessment group or committee to discuss the questions' topics and focus. At such hearings, key witnesses could be invited to give evidence. In addition, engaging international organisations, such as GOPAC and UNDP, may ensure greater support for the self-assessment and provide access to information that may not otherwise be available.
Once the self-assessment has been completed and agreement has been reached on its findings (or reasons for disagreement recorded), two important steps follow. One is to draw up a set of recommendations for appropriate action based on the findings; a second is to disseminate the results of the exercise, together with the recommendations, in an easily accessible form to the parliament, government and other stakeholders.

A. Recommendations for action

The self-assessment exercise is not intended as an end in itself, but rather as a useful means to bringing about improvements in a parliament’s anti-corruption procedures and capacity. Therefore, the first step after completing the assessment is to review the questions where the parliament has been judged to fall short of good practice in some respect (i.e., where the ‘no’ or ‘partly’ column has been ticked). These questions should then form the basis of discussion on a series of recommendations on appropriate action to improve the parliament’s anti-corruption effectiveness. Specific recommendations might involve changes in procedure, enhancement of staff support, more extensive training for members, improved resources, better communication with and from the executive, and other key reforms.

An action plan should then be drawn up and the recommendations categorised on a number of dimensions: high and lower priority; short- and longer-term changes; those within a parliament’s own capacity and those requiring cooperation from other bodies. As such, the action plan could also provide the basis for requests for technical assistance from appropriate external partners.
B. Dissemination

Improvements rarely occur unless an effective coalition of support is created to press for their realisation. With this in mind, it is important for the presentation of the findings and conclusions of the assessment to be in a readable and readily accessible form. Such a document should include a brief statement about the context, purpose and membership of the self-assessment. A summary of the findings should ideally follow, divided into those where the parliament is deemed to have met accepted standards, and those where it has fallen short in whole or part. A viable document would conclude with the list of recommendations for action. Information about how and where to access the full assessment could be appended.

The document should be circulated to all those whose support might be needed to implement the recommendations for action. Such individuals and other stakeholders might include fellow parliamentarians, especially members of relevant committees; parliamentary staff; appropriate members of the executive; civil society organisations and institutions involved in anti-corruption work. Wider publicity could be obtained by posting on the parliamentary website, through media outlets and so on.

Members may be concerned about one-sided negative coverage. This is understandable, as there is a strong likelihood that the media will be more interested in the areas where improvements are identified as being needed. However, the document should also contain examples of the parliament being effective in anti-corruption work, to which attention can be drawn. Moreover, in the longer term this exercise can contribute to building a better relationship between a parliament and the media, including by leading to a reduction in the cases of corruption (which can generate negative coverage).

Members of the self-assessment group might choose to reconvene after an appropriate interval—for example, 12 months—to review the impact of their work and assess progress with the recommendations made.
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## 1. Anti-corruption planning & monitoring

### 1.1 On parliamentary acknowledgement of the UNCAC

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**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

YES’ if UNCAC has been mentioned in parliamentary debates, or if you’ve had debates in parliamentary commissions.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘NO’ if there has not been any formal discussions in the legislature

### 1.2 On parliamentary engagement in planning and monitoring of the national anti-corruption strategy [UNCAC Articles 5(3) and 10]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has parliamentarians been involved in the national review of the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy, laws and/or regulations?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

‘Yes’ if a formal national review of the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy, laws and/or regulations has been established and the parliament has had a role in this review process.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘No’ if there is no review process of the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy, laws and/or regulations. ‘No’ if there is a formal review process but the parliament is not meaningfully involved; (for example, it may just have a symbolic or observer role).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the national anti-corruption strategy have a monitoring framework (with specific targets and measurable indicators)?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

‘Yes’ if the national anti-corruption strategy defines a monitoring framework that can help assess the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy and other related efforts. The framework can comprise measurable indicators and targets related to those indicators.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘No’ if the national anti-corruption strategy does not include a monitoring framework that can help assess the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy, or if the framework is too vague to be of any use.
1.2.3 Is information describing the monitoring framework and its results for the national anti-corruption strategy publicly available?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes” “Yes” if any reports and statistics produced through the implementation of the monitoring framework of the national anti-corruption strategy are available on an official government website or through other means.

Scoring criteria for “No” “No” if the reports and statistics produced through the implementation of the monitoring framework of the national anti-corruption strategy are not available through an official government website or other means. “No” if this information can only be accessed through a freedom-of-information request or similar legal mechanism.

1.2.4 Is the parliament specifically mentioned in the national strategy and progress reports as an institution having a role to play to ensure follow-up on the recommendations of anti-corruption performance reports?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes” “Yes” if the national strategy and progress reports unequivocally mention the parliament’s follow-up role regarding the recommendations of anti-corruption performance reports.

Scoring criteria for “No” “No” if the national strategy and progress reports are vague on the parliament’s role or do not entrust it with responsibilities related to follow-up on the recommendations of the anti-corruption performance reports.

1.3 On parliamentary engagement in the official UNCAC review mechanism [UNCAC Articles 5(1), 5(3) and 63]

1.3.1 Is there a parliamentary committee that has been invited to take part in the review and monitoring of UNCAC implementation?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes” “Yes” if a parliamentary committee has been invited to take part in the review and monitoring of UNCAC implementation. This could be a new, specially created committee or an existing committee whose jurisdiction includes UNCAC.

Scoring criteria for “No” “No” if there is no parliamentary committee invited to take part in the review and monitoring of UNCAC implementation.

1.3.2 Is this committee active (e.g., has this committee held hearings or meetings and/or has it sought advice and collected facts from third party sources, etc.)?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes” “Yes” if this parliamentary committee holds regular hearings, has organised meetings with interested parties, is (or has) engaged with experts, and/or has collected data or commissioned specific studies to generate relevant information.

Scoring criteria for “No” “No” if the parliamentary committee has taken no substantive action to take part in the review and monitoring of UNCAC implementation.

1.3.3 If the government implemented the mandatory UNCAC self-assessment checklist on compliance with the Convention, were parliamentarians engaged in this process?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes” “Yes” if parliamentarians were actively engaged in the implementation of the UNCAC self-assessment checklist.

Scoring criteria for “No” “No” if parliamentarians did not play any role in the UNCAC self-assessment checklist or if their views were not taken into account.
### 1.3.4 Were the parliamentarians informed of the results of this process?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</strong></td>
<td>Yes if parliamentarians received the full report on the findings the UNCAC self-assessment checklist.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “No”</strong></td>
<td>No if parliamentarians did not receive the full report on the findings.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3.5 If parliamentarians were made aware of the results of this self-assessment checklist, have they responded to the recommendations made in the report by setting the legislative agenda accordingly, and/or by strengthening the parliamentary role?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</strong></td>
<td>Yes if parliamentarians have publicly acknowledged UNCAC.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “No”</strong></td>
<td>No if there have been no efforts by the parliament to implement UNCAC and if none of its members have spoken publicly about it.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.3.6 Have parliamentarians had the opportunity to review and contribute to national reports submitted by the government to other regional corruption monitoring mechanisms?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Scoring criteria for “Yes”** | Yes if the parliament has reviewed and/or contributed to the national reports submitted by the government to other regional corruption monitoring mechanisms such as:  
- African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,  
- Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS) and the Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESISIC),  
- African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) on governance to the Secretariat of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),  
- Protocol on the Fight against Corruption (Economic Community of West African States, or ECOWAS),  
- Protocol against Corruption (Southern African Development Community, or SADC), and/or  
- progress reports by European Union candidate countries. |   |        |     |
| **Scoring criteria for “No”** | No if the parliament has not participated in any meaningful way, by either reviewing or directly contributing, to the national reports submitted by the government to other regional corruption monitoring mechanisms. |   |        |     |

### 1.4 On parliamentary engagement with anti-corruption bodies [UNCAC Articles 6 and 36]  

1.4.1 Are there legislative provisions for the parliament to have an oversight role over the main anti-corruption body or bodies?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</strong></td>
<td>Yes if the parliament has the legal tools to exert oversight over the main anti-corruption body or bodies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “No”</strong></td>
<td>No if the parliament does not have the legal tools to exert oversight over the main anti-corruption body or bodies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1.4.2 In practice, is the parliament able to exert oversight over these anti-corruption bodies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
“Yes” if the parliament plays an oversight role over the main anti-corruption body or bodies. (This can be done through public hearings, by requesting reports from these anti-corruption bodies/agencies, and/or by conducting investigations when needed into allegations of misconduct by members of these bodies/agencies.)

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
“No” if the parliament does not provide oversight for the main anti-corruption body or bodies. (This would be the case if the parliament does not hold hearings with the heads of these anti-corruption bodies/agencies, or does not request any information from them.)

### 1.4.3 Does the parliament play an active role in the budget process to ensure that the anti-corruption body or bodies have sufficient resources to implement their mandates?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
“Yes” if the parliament or a committee uses its legislative tools to scrutinize and ensure that an anti-corruption body or bodies is not ineffective due to lack of funding.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
“No” if there are no tools or the tools are not being used by the parliament or a committee to allow for the amendment of the state budget or for investigation and questioning to expose insufficient funding for an anti-corruption body or bodies.

### 1.4.4 Have parliamentarians been involved in anti-corruption public awareness activities, in cooperation with an anti-corruption body or bodies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
“Yes” if the parliament, a parliamentary group or one or more parliamentarians have cooperated with an anti-corruption body to raise public concerns about corruption.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
“No” if the parliament or a group of parliamentarians have not yet envisaged cooperation with an anti-corruption body to raise public concerns about corruption or have acted contrary to such a campaign, or if no such public awareness activity has been envisaged yet by the parliament and/or an anti-corruption body.

### 1.5 On reporting to the parliament on anti-corruption [UNCAC Articles 10, 5(3) and 63]

#### 1.5.1 Are there systematic procedures allowing parliamentarians (and particularly, specific anti-corruption committees) to question the executive on corruption-related issues and reports?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
“Yes” if the law establishes a procedure/mechanism for the parliament to use existing or special committees or bodies to question and/or start an investigation on corruption-related issues and reports.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
“No” if there are no systematic procedures for the parliament to question the executive on corruption-related issues and reports.

#### 1.5.2 In practice, are parliamentarians able to utilize these procedures and question the executive on corruption-related issues and reports?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
“Yes” if existing or special committees or bodies are established to question and/or launch an investigation into corruption-related issues whenever necessary. Political pressures or other factors do not impede the parliament from making use of such mechanisms.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
“No” if political pressures or other factors hinder the ability of the parliament to question and/or start an investigation on corruption-related issues.

“No” if these procedures are conducted in a highly partisan manner.
1.5.3 Does the parliament have access to reports from the government on progress in fighting corruption?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

“Yes” if the progress reports generated by the executive on combating corruption are available to the parliament upon request (and/or an established mechanism provides easy access to these documents for parliamentarians). “Yes” if these reports are readily available to the general public, whether through the internet or other means.

Scoring criteria for “No”

“No” if the progress reports generated by the executive on combating corruption are not available to the parliament upon request or if an established mechanism to provide access to these documents to parliamentarians is deficient and prevents ready access to the information.

“No” if excessive delays or incomplete information diminish the usefulness of the available information to the parliament.

1.6 **On relevance and effectiveness of international support [UNCAC Article 60]**

1.6.1 Has any assistance been provided to help parliamentarians play a more effective role in corruption prevention?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

“Yes” if the parliament, its staff or parliamentarians have previously received support from international experts in terms of:

- capacity-building for parliamentarians and staff;
- specific technical assistance in relation to elements of UNCAC, and/or
- a coordinated donor approach.

Scoring criteria for “No”

“No” if the parliament, its staff or parliamentarians have not received any significant support from the international community with regard to UNCAC.

1.6.2 Have these programmes had a positive impact?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

“Yes” if the technical assistance/capacity-building programmes have had a positive, measurable impact.

Scoring criteria for “No”

“No” if no technical assistance/capacity-building programme has been provided or implemented.

“No” if the technical assistance/capacity-building programme resulted in no impact, or a negative one.
2. Financial oversight

2.1 On the transparency of the budget process [UNCAC Article 9(2)]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.1.1 Is the budgetary process conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e., before final approval), with active involvement by parliamentarians?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if budget debates are public and records of these proceedings are easily accessible. Authors of individual budget items can easily be identified. Nearly all budget negotiations are conducted in these official proceedings. The debating stage has benefited from the active participation of parliamentarians.

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if the parliament is in practical terms excluded from the debating stage, at least in relation to some of the most important budget items. ‘No’ if there is a formal, transparent process, but most real discussion and debate happens in other, closed settings.

2.2 On parliamentary powers to authorize all revenues and expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.2.1 Do parliamentarians have the power to authorize all revenues (tax rates, royalties, fee structures, etc.)?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if the law stipulates that the parliament must approve all sources of public revenues (e.g., tax rates, royalties, fee structures, tariffs, etc.)

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if the law is vague on whether parliamentary approval is required for establishing new sources of public revenue. ‘No’ if the law allows the executive to authorize revenue sources and/or new taxes without the consent of the parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.2.2 In practice, does the parliament approve all revenues?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if the executive seeks the approval of the parliament on matters of public revenues.

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if the executive rarely seeks the approval of the parliament on matters of public revenues and/or if there have been significant instances where the executive has unilaterally imposed new taxes, royalties, etc. without consulting the parliament.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.2.3 Is parliamentary approval also required for ‘significant public expenditures’, including for defence and other ‘sensitive’ programmes, and for the personal budgets of members of the executive branch?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if the law mandates that government expenses for defence, other ‘sensitive’ programmes and the personal budgets of members of the executive branch must be approved by the parliament. (A ‘significant public expenditure’ is defined as any project costing more than 1% of the total national budget).

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if the law is silent on whether parliamentary approval is necessary for government expenses for defence, other ‘sensitive’ programmes and the personal budgets of members of the executive branch. ‘No’ if such line items are explicitly exempted from parliamentary approval.
### 2.2.4 In practice, does the parliament approve these expenditures?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Scoring criteria for “Yes” | "Yes" if the executive seeks the approval of the parliament for decisions on significant public expenditures, including for defence and other ‘sensitive’ programmes, and for the personal budgets of members of the executive branch. The executive produces budgets and other planning documents specifying the itemized budget allocations with explanations for such expenses and/or holds hearings to present such matters to a legislative committee. |
| Scoring criteria for “No” | "No" if the executive does not seek the approval of the parliament for decisions on significant public expenditures, including for defence and other ‘sensitive’ programmes, and for the personal budgets of members of the executive branch. No substantive effort is made to inform the parliament or to obtain its input. "No" if such consultation with the parliament is specifically exempted under law. |

### 2.2.5 Do executive decrees on public finances require subsequent parliamentary review and approval?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Scoring criteria for “Yes” | "Yes" if the law states that executive orders/decrees on public finances require parliamentary approval and review and any exceptions to this law are limited in scope. |
| Scoring criteria for “No” | "No" if there is no law requiring subsequent approval of an executive decree or the law is silent as to such a review and approval. |

### 2.2.6 In practice, is parliamentary approval sought regarding such executive decrees?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Scoring criteria for “Yes” | "Yes" if the executive seeks parliamentary approval of executive orders/decrees on public finances or the parliament automatically starts a review process in a timely manner. |
| Scoring criteria for “No” | "No" if the executive issues orders/decrees on public finances without the consent of the parliament. "No" if the chief executive uses executive orders/decrees to implement policies and budgetary programmes opposed by the parliament. |

### 2.3 On parliamentary budget and that of parliamentary support agencies and committees

#### 2.3.1 Does the parliament have the authority to formulate and approve its own budget and that of its support agencies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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</table>

| Scoring criteria for “Yes” | "Yes" if the parliament has the right to formulate and present budget proposals for itself and its support agencies during the budget proposal discussions/debate stage. |
| Scoring criteria for “No” | "No" if the parliament does not have the legal right to participate in the elaboration or debate of its budget or that of its support agencies. |
### 2.3.2 Are there resources specifically dedicated for the opposition in the parliamentary budget?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

“Yes” if legislation provides budgetary aid for parties or parliamentarians from the opposition, including financing research, voter education and communications.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

“No” if legislation does not provide any financing, or provides only insufficient funding, for parties/parliamentarians from the opposition.

### 2.3.3 Does the parliamentary budget include the provision of professional parliamentary staff to support the committees?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

“Yes” if the parliament’s budget includes the provision of professional parliamentary staff to support the committees. The provisions are sufficient to hire a well-prepared, independent staff to effectively assist parliamentary committees.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

“No” if the parliament’s budget does not include a provision regarding the use of professional parliamentary staff to support the committees. To hire staff, parliamentarians themselves must pay their salaries and expenses or seek support from outside sources, including foreign donors.

“No” if the parliament’s budget includes a provision for such professional staff but it is insufficient to hire well-prepared support personnel.

“No” if the staff is not independent or supports only members of the governing party.

### 2.4 On reporting standards

#### 2.4.1 Are there standards for reporting regularly to the parliament on actual revenues, expenditures and results?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

“Yes” if the executive is required to submit regular public financial management reports to the parliament. This obligation includes providing easy and consistent access to such reports.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

“No” if the executive is under no obligation to provide regular public financial management reports to the parliament.

#### 2.4.2 In practice, is there a well-functioning system of performance reporting to the parliament to show what has been achieved with the funds expended by departments?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

“Yes” if the executive’s public financial management reporting mechanism provides regular and detailed reports to the parliament in an easy-to-understand format.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

“No” if no such public financial management reporting requirements exist in law

“No” if such reports from the executive are not timely, lack basic information or important details, and/or are inaccessible or overly complicated.
### 2.5 On parliamentary budget oversight committee (e.g., public accounts committee)

#### 2.5.1 Is there a budget oversight or a public accounts committee?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**  

**Recommendations**  

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
‘Yes’ if there is a dedicated parliamentary committee that oversees the expenditure of public funds (e.g., a public accounts committee).

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
‘No’ if no such body exists within the parliament.  
‘No’ if there is a body executing this function but it is not part of the parliament (such as a separate supreme audit institution).

#### 2.5.2 Is it chaired by the opposition?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**  

**Recommendations**  

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
‘Yes’ if the public accounts committee is chaired by the opposition.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
‘No’ if the public accounts committee is not chaired by the opposition.

#### 2.5.3 Does the composition of the committee have an impact on its ability to perform its oversight function? (For example, are committee members from the opposition able to influence the committee’s work to the same extent as any other member of the committee?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**  

**Recommendations**  

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
‘Yes’ if all members of the committee – including opposition party members – are able to fully participate in the activities of the committee and influence its work to roughly the same extent as any other member of the committee.  
‘Yes’ if the committee tends to perform its oversight function in a fair and non-partisan manner.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
‘No’ if the committee is dominated by parliamentarians of the ruling party and/or the committee chairperson. Opposition parliamentarians serving on the committee have no way, in practice, to influence the work of the committee.  
‘No’ if the committee typically performs its oversight function in an overly partisan manner.

#### 2.5.4 Does the budget oversight committee meet regularly?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**  

**Recommendations**  

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
‘Yes’ if the committee meets regularly; the hearings or sessions occur as regularly as any other parliamentary committee.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
‘No’ if the committee does not meet at all or the hearings or sessions occur irregularly and/or very infrequently, thus negatively affecting the working of the committee.
2.5.5 When necessary, does the committee initiate independent investigations into financial irregularities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  “Yes” if the parliamentary budget oversight committee (or public accounts committee), when financial irregularities are discovered, is proactive in investigating and/or in cooperating with other investigative bodies. The parliamentary committee can control the timing and pace of its investigations without any input from the executive.

Scoring criteria for “No”  “No” if the parliamentary budget oversight committee (or public accounts committee) does not effectively investigate financial irregularities or cooperate with other investigative agencies. The parliamentary committee may start investigations but not complete them, may fail to detect offenders, or must receive the approval of the executive before initiating investigations. The committee may be partisan in exercising its power. Politically sensitive investigations are almost impossible to move forward on.

2.5.6 Are parliamentarians able to obtain non-financial (i.e., performance) information related to expenditures?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  “Yes” if parliamentarians are able to obtain non-financial (i.e., performance) information related to expenditures in a relatively short amount of time.

Scoring criteria for “No”  “No” if parliamentarians are not able to obtain non-financial (i.e., performance) information related to expenditures, or the information they receive is outdated or incomplete.

‘No’ if delays in the retrieval of this information substantially affect its usefulness.

2.5.7 Are recommendations from the budget oversight or public accounts committee reviewed by the government and implemented where appropriate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  “Yes” if the reports and recommendations by the committee are taken seriously by the government, and they prompt, when appropriate, amendments and corrections to budget proposals and budget execution.

Scoring criteria for “No”  “No” if the recommendations and reports by the committee are often ignored, or are given superficial attention by the government. The committee’s recommendations and reports rarely lead to policy changes.

2.6 On parliamentary powers to call witnesses

2.6.1 Do parliamentarians have the authority during public hearings of committees to call witnesses, including ministers and officials?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  “Yes” if the law establishes that the parliament has the power to call witnesses, including ministers and officials, to hearings related to oversight of public finances.

Scoring criteria for “No”  “No” if the law does not empower the parliament to call witnesses, including ministers and officials, to hearings related to oversight of public finances.
2.6.2 In practice, do parliamentary committees hold public hearings on the budgets and results of government departments in which testimony from the executive branch and others (e.g., stakeholders affected by departmental activities) is heard?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if public hearings are held regularly (when needed) by parliamentary committees on budgets and issues related to the results of government departments. Testimony from members of the executive and other interested parties, such as stakeholders affected by departmental activities, is heard.

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if parliamentary committees do not hold regular hearings on budget execution and issues related to the results of government departments or if the hearings are not public (i.e., closed sessions).

‘No’ if hearings are convened but are understood to be pro forma.

2.7 On parliamentary engagement in resource revenues and transparency [UNCAC Articles 9(1), 9(2) and 10]

2.7.1 Is there one (or several) parliamentary committee(s) responsible for monitoring resource revenues generated from extractive industries (e.g., a committee on energy, a committee on forest and environment, and/or a committee on mining, etc.)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if there is one (or several) dedicated parliamentary committees responsible for monitoring resource revenues generated from extractive industries.

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if no such body or bodies exist within the parliament.

‘No’ if there is an entity or entities executing this function but it or they are not a part of the parliament (such as the supreme audit institution).

2.7.2 Are committee members from the opposition party able to influence the work of such committees?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if all members of the committee or committees – including opposition party members – are able to fully participate in activities and influence the committees’ work to roughly the same extent as any other member.

‘Yes’ if the committee or committees tend to perform oversight function in a fair and non-partisan manner.

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if the committee or committees are dominated by parliamentarians of the ruling party and/or the chairperson. Opposition parliamentarians serving on the committee have no way, in practice, to influence the work of the committee or committees.

‘No’ if the committee or committees typically perform oversight function in an overly partisan manner.

2.7.3 Do the committee or committees meet regularly?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”

‘Yes’ if the oversight committee or committees meet regularly; the hearings or sessions occur with roughly the same regularity as the average parliamentary committee.

Scoring criteria for “No”

‘No’ if the oversight committee or committees do not meet at all or the hearings or sessions occur irregularly and/or very infrequently, thus negatively affecting the working of the committees.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.7.4 Are all relevant committees' recommendations reviewed by the government and implemented where appropriate?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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<td>Recommendations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Yes’ if the reports and recommendations by the parliament on these issues are taken seriously by the government – and prompt, when appropriate, amendments and corrections to government policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “No”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“No’ if the recommendations and reports by the parliament on these issues are often ignored, or given superficial attention by the government. The parliament’s recommendations and reports do not lead to policy changes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.7.5 Are parliamentarians engaged in decisions to extract natural resources?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Yes’ if the parliament is an essential component of the political process regarding decisions to extract natural resources. Parliamentarians provide insights and community perspective to the decision-making process and have the power to affect policy decisions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “No”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“No’ if the parliament is irrelevant to policy decisions around natural resource extraction. ‘No’ if the executive has the ability to make policy decisions on these issues without the parliament’s consent.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.7.6 Is the process of awarding exploration, development and production licenses to private companies publicly disclosed?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Yes’ if the process of awarding exploration, development and production licenses to private companies is publicly disclosed. There is a formal process to advertise public procurements (when appropriate) that clearly states the requirements to bid. The major procurements are advertised either through a government website, newspaper advertising or other official announcements. There is sufficient time to allow for bidders to respond to advertisements. The results of the procurement bids are advertised; also advertised is a list of companies that have obtained licenses for exploration, development and production as well as other details about the process, including the reasons for granting the licenses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “No”</td>
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<tr>
<td>“No’ if the process of awarding exploration, development and production licenses to private companies is not publicly disclosed. There is no formal process to advertise public procurements or the process is superficial and ineffective. ‘No’ if it is difficult to obtain information regarding private companies that have been granted a license for exploration, development and production.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.7.7 Can the parliament review all contracts related to the extraction of natural resources before they are finalized?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>“Yes’ if there is a formal process by which the parliament can review all contracts for extractive industries, regardless of the amount of the contract.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scoring criteria for “No”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“No’ if there is no process or mechanism by which the parliament can review the contracts for extractive industries. ‘No’ if there is a formal process by which the parliament can review such contracts but only for those that exceed a certain financial threshold. ‘No’ if the process is defined vaguely in law or regulation and no formal procedures are specified.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 2.7.8 Is the parliament engaged in the allocation of revenues from extractive industries?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”: "Yes" if all revenues from extractive industries are accounted for in the annual state budget approved by the parliament and the parliament has the final authority to allocate revenues.

Scoring criteria for “No”: "No" if all or some of the revenues from extractive industries are not accounted for in the annual state budget or there are restrictions on the ability of the parliament to allocate such funds.

### 2.7.9 Does the parliament have sufficient human capacity, expertise and training to ensure resource monitoring and transparency?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”: "Yes" if the parliament benefits from trained and dedicated staff with the technical skills and expertise.

Scoring criteria for “No”: "No" if the parliament lacks specialized staff with the skills and expertise.

### 2.8 On parliamentary capacity for financial analysis [UNCAC Article 9(2)]

#### 2.8.1 Does the parliament have sufficient human capacity to monitor government financial practices, including competent parliamentary staff?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”: "Yes" if the parliament benefits from trained and dedicated staff with the technical skills and expertise to advise parliamentarians on the details of public financial management.

Scoring criteria for “No”: "No" if the parliament lacks specialized staff with the skills to assist members with analyzing public financial management issues. "No" if such staff exists but is in such short supply as to hinder the parliament's ability to provide effective oversight. "No" if the parliament uses parliamentary group staff instead of independent parliamentary staff (This refers to instances when each political party represented in the parliament through a 'parliamentary group' is provided with funding to hire its own staff to conduct research, etc.).

#### 2.8.2 Is the parliamentary infrastructure and its technical equipment adequate for parliamentarians to be able to perform their oversight function effectively?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”: "Yes" if the parliament's infrastructure and technical equipment allow parliamentarians to perform their oversight function effectively. Lack of infrastructure does not necessarily cause poor parliamentary oversight.

Scoring criteria for “No”: "No" if the parliament's infrastructure and technical equipment fail to meet minimum standards to enable parliamentarians to perform their oversight function effectively. "No" if dedicated office space and access to research materials (including online) are not available.
2.9.1 Is there legislation or other instruments to guide the executive in utilizing all financial instruments, including in regards to procurement, contracts, grants and loans?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  
‘Yes’ if there is legislation that establishes formal guidelines governing all public financial management functions, including procurement, contracts, grants and loans by the executive.

Scoring criteria for “No”  
‘No’ if there are no guidelines or regulations governing public financial management functions carried out by the executive branch.  
‘No’ if such guidelines are overly general and lack specificity.

---

2.9.2 Does the parliament approve the expenditure of contingency funds or other funds for which no specific purpose was identified?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  
‘Yes’ if the expenditure of contingency funds or other funds for which no specific purpose was identified in the budget is approved by the parliament at least in the subsequent budget, if not before the end of the fiscal year. A review process by the parliament can potentially halt the expenditure of these funds, at least those that have not yet been disbursed.

Scoring criteria for “No”  
‘No’ if there is no formal process or mechanism by which the parliament approves the expenditure of contingency funds or other funds for which no specific purpose was identified in the budget in the next budget cycle, if not before the end of the fiscal year.  
‘No’ if the requirement for parliamentary approval of such expenditures is vaguely established in law or regulation and does not include formal procedures. (Both of these situations that substantially hinder implementation of the requirement.)  
‘No’ if the parliament can review the expenditure of these funds, but this process cannot reverse or stop these funds from being expended, including the ones that have not yet been disbursed.

---

2.10 Does the independent audit institution report to the parliament on its findings?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  
‘Yes’ if the independent audit institution or the equivalent agency(ies) makes regular substantial reports to the parliament outlining the full scope of its work and its findings and audits.

Scoring criteria for “No”  
‘No’ if the independent audit institution or the equivalent agency(ies) makes no reports of its activities, or makes reports to the parliament that are consistently out of date, are incomplete or are lacking in substance.  
‘No’ if the audit agency(ies) report only to the executive and not the parliament.

---

2.8.3 Has an independent parliamentary budget office been established which i) strengthens the parliament’s technical capacity to interpret budget and economic data, and ii) provides parliamentarians with objective, timely and independent analysis?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

---

2.9 On the control of the parliament over the executive [UNCAC Article 9(2)]
### 2.10.2 Does the parliament appoint the head of the independent audit institution?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
"Yes" if the parliament plays an active role in the non-partisan selection and approval of the person who is in charge of the independent audit institution.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
"No" if the parliament does not play an active role in the selection and approval of the head of the institution.

### 2.10.3 Is there at least one parliamentary committee responsible for reviewing and scrutinizing all significant audit reports, and does it have adequate resources to carry out this mandate?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
"Yes" if there is a dedicated parliamentary committee (or equivalent group located within parliament) that is responsible for reviewing and scrutinizing all significant audit reports from the independent audit institution or the equivalent agency(ies). and scrutinizing all significant audit reports from the independent audit institution or the equivalent agency(ies).

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
"No" if such body does not exist within the parliament or does not have adequate resources.

### 2.10.4 Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (military, police, intelligence services) and other ‘sensitive’ programmes provided to the parliament (or relevant committee)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
"Yes" if the parliamentary committee responsible for reviewing and scrutinizing all significant audit reports or any other legislative body is provided the reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (military, police, and intelligence services) and other ‘sensitive’ programmes. The audit reports contain detailed information.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
"No" if the parliamentary committee responsible for reviewing and scrutinizing all significant audit reports or any other parliamentary body is not provided the reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (military, police, and intelligence services) and other ‘sensitive’ programmes.

'No' if the parliamentary committee/body can obtain some form of such audit reports but these are incomplete or fail to include detailed information about the ‘sensitive’ programmes, or are outdated.

### 2.10.5 Does the executive make a report available to the parliament on what steps it has taken to address audit recommendations or findings that indicate a need for remedial action?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
"Yes" if the executive makes a discussion available to the parliament of what steps it plans to take to address the findings of the independent audit institution or the equivalent agency(ies) that call for remedial action.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
"No" if the executive fails to make a description available to the parliament of how the executive plans to respond to audit findings that call for remedial action.

'No' if such responses are provided by the executive to the parliament but are vague or perfunctory.
### 2.11 On money laundering and parliamentary engagement in recovery of assets [UNCAC Articles 14 and 58]

#### 2.11.1 Is there legislation in place in your country for the prevention and detection of money laundering?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

- Yes if there is legislation in place for prevention and detection of money laundering, including requirements of effective customer identification, record-keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

- No if there is no legislation in place for prevention and detection of money laundering.
- No if the legislation is vague, or not comprehensive. The legislation may fail to cover effective customer identification, record-keeping and reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions.

#### 2.11.2 Has a financial intelligence unit (FIU) been established?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

- Yes if a FIU has been established to serve as a national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential money-laundering.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

- No if a FIU has not been established.

#### 2.11.3 Does the FIU report to the parliament, respond to recommendations and receive budget allocation from the parliament?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

- Yes if the FIU reports to the parliament and responds to recommendations, and if the parliament is engaged in the budgetary allocation for the FIU.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

- No if there is no reporting mechanism including the parliament, if the FIU does not need to respond to the parliament’s recommendations, and/or if the parliament is not engaged in the budgetary allocation.

#### 2.11.4 Have any money laundering cases been prosecuted in the past five years?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

- Yes if money laundering cases have been prosecuted in the past five years. If yes: in how many instances?

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

- No if money laundering cases have not been prosecuted in the past five years.

#### 2.11.5 If any money laundering cases have been prosecuted in the last five years, have any corrupt assets been recovered?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Explanations</td>
<td>Recommendation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

- Yes if corrupt assets have been recovered. If yes: in how many instances?

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

- No if no corrupt assets have been recovered.
3. Standards of conduct

3.1 On establishing public service standards [UNCAC Article 7]

3.1.1 Has the parliament established through legislation standards for the public service, including appointment, compensation and accountability measures?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  ‘Yes’ if the parliament has adopted legislation related to:
- regulations to prevent nepotism, cronism, and patronage within the civil service,
- redress mechanism for the civil service,
- legislation to prevent civil servants convicted of corruption from future government employment, and
- ethics and conflict of interest guidelines for civil servants.

Scoring criteria for “No”  ‘No’ if the parliament has not created a fully sufficient legal framework to ensure an independent and accountable civil service.

3.2 On ethics and conduct mechanism [UNCAC Articles 7(3), 8, 52(5) and 52(6)]

3.2.1 Is there a formal, and independent, ethics and conduct mechanism in place for parliamentarians?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  ‘Yes’ if there is a formal, impartial and independent institutional mechanism within the parliament or outside, such as an ethics committee, which is charged with enforcing ethics requirements for parliamentarians.

Scoring criteria for “No”  ‘No’ if no such impartial or independent mechanism or committee exists or if such a mechanism or committee is not seen as impartial or independent.

3.2.2 Were parliamentarians from all parties actively involved in the development of the ethics and conduct mechanism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  ‘Yes’ if the full range of parliamentarians and parliamentary groups were actively involved in the process that resulted in the adoption of the ethics and conduct mechanism.

Scoring criteria for “No”  ‘No’ if there is no such mechanism.

‘No’ if the existing rules were developed without contributions or substantive engagement from parliamentarians from all parliamentary groups.

3.2.3 Are there specific rules in the ethics and conduct mechanism covering all sources of payment or favours?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Explanations

Recommendations

Scoring criteria for “Yes”  ‘Yes’ if the parliament has specific rules related to:
- gifts and hospitality,
- direct payments or bribes,
- sponsored travel,
- outside employment/income while in office,
- conflict of interest between the private and the public interest of the parliamentarian (e.g., divesting public goods or place them into a blind trust),
- outstanding loans,
- outside activities, and
- employment after leaving office (the parliament).

Scoring criteria for “No”  ‘No’ if the parliament has rules about ethics and conduct that are general (and not specific).

‘No’ if there are no rules related to ethics or conduct.
### 3.2.4 Are there provisions for parliamentarians to be able to get impartial and informed advice on the rules of ethics and conduct mechanisms?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “Yes”</td>
<td>“Yes” if there is an internal or external source of advice from which a parliamentarian can seek guidance on a confidential basis, including access to private and confidential legal advice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “No”</td>
<td>“No” if a parliamentarian either has no access to ethical advice or only has access to advice that is neither impartial nor confidential.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.5 Are there provisions for parliamentarians to disclose assets and liabilities, including those of family members, on an annual basis to a specific entity or body that is responsible for these records?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “Yes”</td>
<td>“Yes” if there are legal or regulatory requirements for parliamentarians' disclosures of assets and liabilities, including those of family members, to a specific entity or body that is responsible for these records.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “No”</td>
<td>“No” if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for parliamentarians' disclosures of assets and liabilities, including those of family members, to a specific entity or body that is responsible for these records.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.6 In practice, are these provisions for systematic disclosure of the assets and liabilities declarations effectively implemented?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “Yes”</td>
<td>“Yes” if the system of assets and liabilities declarations exists and ensures that all required disclosures occur regularly on a timely basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “No”</td>
<td>“No” if the system of assets and liabilities declarations is routinely ignored or if deadlines for disclosures are missed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.7 Are the disclosures of assets and liabilities by parliamentarians subject to external audit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “Yes”</td>
<td>“Yes” if there are legal or regulatory requirements for independent auditing of parliamentarians' disclosures of assets and liabilities. Such audits should be performed by an impartial third party, and the results should be made public within a reasonable time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “No”</td>
<td>“No” if there are no legal or regulatory requirements for the independent auditing of parliamentarians' disclosures of assets and liabilities, or if such requirements exist but allow for self-auditing.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.2.8 Are there limitations in place for campaign-related expenditures that are subject to audit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “Yes”</td>
<td>“Yes” if there are legal or regulatory requirements on the expenditures for electoral campaigns. Audits regarding such expenditures should be performed by an impartial third party, and the results should be made public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Score criteria for “No”</td>
<td>“No” if there are no legal or regulatory requirements on the expenditures for electoral campaigns. “No” if such requirements exist but allow internal auditing or if the results are not made public within a reasonable time.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.2.9 Is information on the provisions of the ethics and conduct mechanism in place for parliamentarians?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

‘Yes’ if parliamentarians are provided with a seminar and/or documents that clearly provide details as to their obligations related to ethics.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘No’ if there is no seminar and/or documents that clearly provide details as to their obligations related to ethics.

‘No’ if parliamentarians are provided with seminars or documents that are complex or unclear.

### 3.2.10 Is there a legal restriction on parliamentarians guaranteeing future employment with the government before resigning a seat?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

‘Yes’ if regulations or laws are in place that limit parliamentarians’ ability to use their influence to secure future employment.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘No’ if there are no regulations or laws in place that limit parliamentarians’ ability to use their influence to secure future employment.

‘No’ if such regulations or laws are in place but are inadequate or not applied in a coherent manner.

### 3.2.11 Is there any regulation in place governing the funding of political parties and the public disclosure of such funding?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

‘Yes’ if there exist regulations or laws and they are implemented coherently. This would mean, for example, that the regulations and laws i) define who can fund parties and to what extent, and ii) require publication of funding.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘No’ if no such regulations and laws are in place governing the funding of political parties and/or the public disclosure of such funding.

### 3.2.12 Are there provisions in place to ensure that the rules of ethics and conduct are followed in a fair manner?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

‘Yes’ if there is a dedicated entity in charge of a legal framework, such as:

- an external body,
- an internal body (e.g., a committee of parliamentarians),
- an independent officer of the parliament (perhaps a committee providing oversight), or
- some or all of the above.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘No’ if there is no legal framework in place to ensure rules of ethics and conduct are followed.

‘No’ if the legal framework is general or unclear.

### 3.3 On conflict of interest

#### 3.3.1 Is there a clear definition of ‘conflict of interest’?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

‘Yes’ if ‘conflict of interest’ is defined to mean a situation in which a parliamentarian’s personal interests present a real or perceived conflict with his or her official duties, and where those personal interests could influence the performance of his or her public duties.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

‘No’ if ‘conflict of interest’ is left vaguely defined or avoids identifying situations in which a parliamentarian’s personal interests might come into conflict with the performance of his or her official duties.
### 3.3.2 Do parliamentarians have a legal burden to declare a conflict of interest?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
Yes if parliamentarians are themselves required to identify and declare potential conflicts of interest. This declaration may or may not follow consultations with appropriate ethics officers.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
No if an outside party must identify and declare real or perceived conflicts of interests affecting parliamentarians.

### 3.3.3 Is the declaration followed by recusal or abstaining from debate or voting on issues related to the conflict of interest?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
Yes if recusal from official duties that involve an identified conflict of interest is required after the conflict is identified.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
No if recusal from official duties is not required following the identification and declaration of a conflict of interest.

### 3.3.4 Is the declaration recorded somewhere (e.g., the public registry) so that the public is aware of it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
Yes if there is a publicly accessible mechanism through which declared conflicts of interest can be made available to the public.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
No if no such mechanisms exists or if the information recorded is not made available to the public.

### 3.4 On complaints against parliamentarians and investigations

#### 3.4.1 Is there a procedure for citizens to initiate complaints against parliamentarians?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
Yes if the parliament or an external authority has established an independent procedure for complaints that is open to all citizens.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
No if no such independent procedure for complaints exists or an existing one is not open to all citizens.

#### 3.4.2 Are sanctions available if complaints are upheld?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Recommendations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
Yes if there are penalties and sanctions available against parliamentarians if complaints are upheld.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
No if there are no penalties or sanctions available or if the penalties are not adequately or fairly applied.
### 3.5 On legal framework for parliamentary immunity [UNCAC Article 30(2)]

#### 3.5.1 Is there a system of parliamentary immunity in place?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
- ‘Yes’ if such a system reflects one of the following two structures:
  - ‘non-accountability’ or ‘non-liability’, whereby parliamentarians cannot be prosecuted for any opinions expressed or votes cast in parliamentary business;
  - ‘inviolability’, whereby parliamentarians cannot be prosecuted for any criminal activity during the term of their parliamentary mandate unless they are caught in that act (and the prosecution can only occur with the approval of the parliament).

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
- ‘No’ if there is no parliamentary immunity system in place.
- ‘No’ if the system of immunity lacks public confidence and is used by parliamentarians to avoid legitimate prosecutions.

#### 3.5.2 Are there clear, balanced, transparent and enforceable procedures in place for waiving parliamentary immunities in cases of criminal acts or ethical violations committed by parliamentarians while they are in office?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
- ‘Yes’ if there are established procedures – which are clear, balanced, transparent and enforceable – for waiving/lifting the immunity of parliamentarians in cases of criminal acts or ethical violations committed while still in office. These procedures are applied equally to all parliamentarians regardless of party affiliation.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
- ‘No’ if there are no established procedures for waiving/lifting the immunity of parliamentarians in cases of criminal acts or ethical violations committed while in office.
- ‘No’ if the procedures to waive/lift the parliamentarians’ immunity exist but are overly vague or are applied unequally based on partisan affiliation.

#### 3.5.3 Are there rules in place that stipulate that parliamentary immunity does not apply to actions taken by individual parliamentarians before they have assumed office or after they have left public office?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
- ‘Yes’ if there are clear and well-defined rules specifying that any immunity granted to parliamentarians does not apply to actions taken before assuming and after leaving public office.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
- ‘No’ if the rules regulating the immunity granted to parliamentarians do not specify that the immunity is limited to actions during the time the parliamentarian is in office.
- ‘No’ if there have been cases where parliamentarians have benefited from immunity for actions taken before they took office or after they left office.

#### 3.5.4 In the last five years, have any parliamentarians used their immunity to avoid being prosecuted for alleged corruption or other criminal activities?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**
- If ‘yes’, how many specific cases have occurred during the last five years?

**Scoring criteria for “No”**
- ‘No’ if there has not been any such specific cases the last five years.
## 4. Parliamentary accessibility and outreach

### 4.1 On civil society [UNCAC Article 13]

#### 4.1.1 Does the parliament engage civil society, media and experts (including international agencies and other non-governmental institutions) in committee hearings and consultations on the prevention of corruption?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</strong></td>
<td>“Yes’ if the parliament or one or more of its committees routinely invite submissions and testimony from civil society, academics and other external experts through an open and transparent process accessible to the media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “No”</strong></td>
<td>“No’ if the parliament and its committees do not routinely invite or seek expert testimony or submissions from civil society, academics or other external experts, or if does so through closed and inaccessible procedures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Scoring criteria for “Yes”
- Yes if the parliament or one or more of its committees routinely invite submissions and testimony from civil society, academics and other external experts through an open and transparent process accessible to the media.

#### Scoring criteria for “No”
- No if the parliament and its committees do not routinely invite or seek expert testimony or submissions from civil society, academics or other external experts, or if does so through closed and inaccessible procedures.

### 4.2 On constituencies [UNCAC Article 13]

#### 4.2.1 Do parliamentarians have functioning and accessible regional or local offices to meet with constituents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</strong></td>
<td>“Yes’ if parliamentarians elected directly through a ‘first past the post’ (plurality) voting system have functioning and accessible regional/local offices to meet with constituents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “No”</strong></td>
<td>“No’ if parliamentarians elected through a party list proportional representation system have regional/local offices to meet with constituents.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Scoring criteria for “Yes”
- Yes if parliamentarians elected directly through a ‘first past the post’ (plurality) voting system have functioning and accessible regional/local offices to meet with constituents.

#### Scoring criteria for “No”
- No if parliamentarians elected through a party list proportional representation system have regional/local offices to meet with constituents.

#### 4.2.2 Is there sufficient funding allocated for travel to allow parliamentarians to meet regularly with constituents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</strong></td>
<td>“Yes’ if parliamentarians benefit from sufficient travel funds that can be used to meet regularly with constituents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “No”</strong></td>
<td>“No’ if no such funds are available, or if such funds are made available to parliamentarians but in an insufficient volume such that direct consultations with constituents are problematic.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Scoring criteria for “Yes”
- Yes if parliamentarians benefit from sufficient travel funds that can be used to meet regularly with constituents.

#### Scoring criteria for “No”
- No if no such funds are available, or if such funds are made available to parliamentarians but in an insufficient volume such that direct consultations with constituents are problematic.

#### 4.2.3 Is there a procedure for citizens and civil society groups to make submissions to a parliamentary committee?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanations</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “Yes”</strong></td>
<td>“Yes’ if citizens and civil society groups can easily submit information and testimony to parliamentary committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scoring criteria for “No”</strong></td>
<td>“No’ if citizens and civil society groups are prohibited from submitting information or testimony to such committees, or if the procedures are overly technical and/or require a level of legal expertise that has the effect of discouraging public comment and testimony.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Scoring criteria for “Yes”
- Yes if citizens and civil society groups can easily submit information and testimony to parliamentary committees.

#### Scoring criteria for “No”
- No if citizens and civil society groups are prohibited from submitting information or testimony to such committees, or if the procedures are overly technical and/or require a level of legal expertise that has the effect of discouraging public comment and testimony.
4.3.1 Is there legislation in place for access to information?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**  

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
Yes if there is legislation in place that grants the right to access to government documents. Exceptions can be made for national security reasons or individual privacy, but they should be limited in scope. All other government documents should be available upon request from the public.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
No if there is no legislation granting the public’s right to information. ‘No’ if such legislation exists but the exceptions mentioned in the law are too ambiguous, a situation that can lead to abuses of exemption provisions around privacy or national security.

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4.3.2 Is access to information legislation comprehensive?  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**  

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**  
Yes if the legislation guarantees that citizens have the right to seek, receive, publish and disseminate government information. The legislation establishes an appropriate institutional/formal mechanism through which citizens can request and access government records available under this legislation. The legislation establishes an appeals mechanism for rejected information requests. The legislation requests that the government gives reasons for denying information requests.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**  
No if the legislation is not comprehensive enough to guarantee that citizens have the right to seek, receive, publish and disseminate government information. There may be significant loopholes in the law that affect the proper functioning of the law, including the lack of a formal mechanism through which citizens can request and access government information. Other significant obstacles might include expensive or inaccessible appeals procedures and/or lack of specificity on the part of government in explaining why information requests have been rejected.
4.3.3 Does the parliament play an active role in the budget process to ensure that sufficient funds are allocated for the effective implementation of any access to information legislation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

Yes if the parliament or a committee uses its legislative tools to scrutinize and ensure that a proper regulatory authority is established and maintained to ensure access to information.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

No if there are no relevant legislative policies or tools.

No if such tools exist but are not used to allow for the amendment of the state budget or the investigation and questioning to expose insufficient funding.

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4.3.4 Can citizens and/or journalists access records of parliamentary processes and reports of parliamentary committees within a reasonable time period?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

Yes if citizens/journalists can access records of parliamentary processes and reports of parliamentary committees online, or can obtain them within one month. Records are free or for the cost of photocopying.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

No if citizens/journalists cannot access records of parliamentary processes and reports of parliamentary committees online.

No if citizens/journalists can access such records, but i) it takes more than one month to obtain them, ii) retrieving records may require a visit to a specific office, such as a regional/national capital, and/or iii) record costs are prohibitive to most citizens/journalists.

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### 4.4 On regulation of lobbying

**4.4.1 Are there binding rules in place governing parliamentary lobbying?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

Yes if the parliament or an external authority has created and implemented precise regulations regarding lobbying of parliamentarians.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

No if there are no regulations concerning lobbying of parliamentarians or if existing regulations are not applied fairly and adequately.

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**4.4.2 Do lobbyists have to register with the parliament?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partly</th>
<th>N/A</th>
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</table>

**Explanations**

**Scoring criteria for “Yes”**

Yes if everyone who lobbies a parliamentarian must register in a public registry.

**Scoring criteria for “No”**

No if there are no rules concerning lobbying parliamentarians or if existing rules are not applied fairly and adequately.
Annex
**Short version of the self-assessment tool**

*(Questions for evaluation)*

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1. Anti-corruption planning & monitoring

1.1 On parliamentary acknowledgement of UNCAC

1.1.1 Have parliamentarians in your country publicly acknowledged UNCAC?

1.1.2 Has there been any briefing or training of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff on UNCAC?

1.2 On parliamentary engagement in planning and monitoring of the national anti-corruption strategy [UNCAC Articles 5(3) and 10]

1.2.1 Have parliamentarians been involved in the national review of the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy, laws and/or regulations?

1.2.2 Does the national anti-corruption strategy have a monitoring framework (with specific targets and measurable indicators)?

1.2.3 Is information describing the monitoring framework and its results for the national anti-corruption strategy publicly available?

1.2.4 Is the parliament specifically mentioned in the national strategy and progress reports as an institution having a role to play to ensure follow-up on the recommendations of anti-corruption performance reports?

1.3 On parliamentary engagement in the official UNCAC review mechanism [UNCAC Articles 5(1), 5(3) and 63]

1.3.1 Is there a parliamentary committee that has been invited to take part in the review and monitoring of UNCAC implementation?

1.3.2 Is this committee active (e.g., has this committee held hearings or meetings and/or has it sought advice and collected facts from third party sources, etc.)?

1.3.3 If the government implemented the mandatory UNCAC self-assessment checklist on compliance with the Convention, were parliamentarians engaged in this process?

1.3.4 Were parliamentarians informed of the results of this process?

1.3.5 If parliamentarians were made aware of the results of this self-assessment checklist, have they responded to the recommendations made in the report by setting the legislative agenda accordingly, and/or by strengthening the parliamentary role?

1.3.6 Have parliamentarians had the opportunity to review and contribute to national reports submitted by the government to other regional corruption monitoring mechanisms?

1.4 On parliamentary engagement with anti-corruption bodies [UNCAC Articles 6 and 36]

1.4.1 Are there legislative provisions for the parliament to have an oversight role over the main anti-corruption body or bodies?

1.4.2 In practice, is the parliament able to exert oversight over these anti-corruption bodies?

1.4.3 Does the parliament play an active role in the budget process to ensure that the anti-corruption body or bodies have sufficient resources to implement their mandates?

1.4.4 Have parliamentarians been involved in anti-corruption public awareness activities, in cooperation with an anti-corruption body or bodies?

1.5 On reporting to the parliament on anti-corruption [UNCAC Articles 10, 5(3) and 63]

1.5.1 Are there systematic procedures allowing parliamentarians (and particularly, specific anti-corruption committees) to question the executive on corruption-related issues and reports?

1.5.2 In practice, are parliamentarians able to utilize these procedures and question the executive on corruption-related issues and reports?

1.5.3 Does the parliament have access to reports from the government on progress in fighting corruption?

1.6 On relevance and effectiveness of international support [UNCAC Article 60]

1.6.1 Has any assistance been provided to help parliamentarians play a more effective role in corruption prevention?

1.6.2 Have these programmes had a positive impact?
2. Financial oversight

2.1 On the transparency of the budget process [UNCAC Article 9(2)]

2.1.1 Is the budgetary process conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval), with active involvement by parliamentarians?

2.2 On parliamentary powers to authorize all revenues and expenditures

2.2.1 Do parliamentarians have the power to authorize all revenues (tax rates, royalties, fee structures, etc.)?

2.2.2 In practice, does the parliament approve all revenues?

2.2.3 Is parliamentary approval also required for ‘significant public expenditures,’ including for defence and other ‘sensitive’ programmes, and for the personal budgets of members of the executive branch?

2.2.4 In practice, does the parliament approve these expenditures?

2.2.5 Do executive decrees on public finances require subsequent parliamentary review and approval?

2.2.6 In practice, is parliamentary approval sought regarding such executive decrees?

2.3 On parliamentary budget and that of parliamentary support agencies and committees

2.3.1 Does the parliament have the authority to formulate and approve its own budget and that of its support agencies?

2.3.2 Are there resources specifically dedicated for the opposition in the parliamentary budget?

2.3.3 Does the parliamentary budget include the provision of professional parliamentary staff to support committees?

2.4 On reporting standards

2.4.1 Are there standards for reporting regularly to the parliament on actual revenues, expenditures and results?

2.4.2 In practice, is there a well-functioning system of performance reporting to the parliament to show what has been achieved with the funds expended by departments?

2.5 On parliamentary budget oversight committee (e.g., public accounts committee)

2.5.1 Is there a budget oversight or a public accounts committee?

2.5.2 Is it chaired by the opposition?

2.5.3 Does the composition of the committee have an impact on its ability to perform its oversight function? (For example, are committee members from the opposition able to influence the committee’s work to the same extent as any other member of the committee?)

2.5.4 Does the budget oversight committee meet regularly?

2.5.5 When necessary, does the committee initiate independent investigations into financial irregularities?

2.5.6 Are parliamentarians able to obtain non-financial (i.e., performance) information related to expenditures?

2.5.7 Are recommendations from the budget oversight or public accounts committee reviewed by the government and implemented where appropriate?

2.6 On parliamentary powers to call witnesses

2.6.1 Do parliamentarians have the authority during public hearings of committees to call witnesses, including ministers and officials?

2.6.2 In practice, do parliamentary committees hold public hearings on the budgets and results of government departments in which testimony from the executive branch and others (e.g., stakeholders affected by departmental activities) is heard?
2.7 On parliamentary engagement in resource revenues and transparency [UNCAC Articles 9(1), 9(2) and 10]

2.7.1 Is there one (or several) parliamentary committee(s) responsible for monitoring resource revenues generated from extractive industries (e.g., a committee on energy, a committee on forest and environment, and/or a committee on mining, etc.)?

2.7.2 Are committee members from the opposition party able to influence the work of such committees?

2.7.3 Do the committee or committees meet regularly?

2.7.4 Are all relevant committees’ recommendations reviewed by the government and implemented where appropriate?

2.7.5 Are parliamentarians engaged in decisions to extract natural resources?

2.7.6 Is the process of awarding exploration, development and production licenses to private companies publicly disclosed?

2.7.7 Can the parliament review all contracts related to the extraction of natural resources before they are finalized?

2.7.8 Is the parliament engaged in the allocation of revenues from extractive industries?

2.7.9 Does the parliament have sufficient human capacity, expertise and training to ensure resource monitoring and transparency?

2.8 On parliamentary capacity for financial analysis [UNCAC Article 9(2)]

2.8.1 Does the parliament have sufficient human capacity to monitor government financial practices, including competent parliamentary staff?

2.8.2 Is the parliamentary infrastructure and its technical equipment adequate for parliamentarians to be able to perform their oversight function effectively?

2.8.3 Has an independent parliamentary budget office been established which i) strengthens the parliament’s technical capacity to interpret budget and economic data, and ii) provides parliamentarians with objective, timely and independent analysis?

2.9 On the control of the parliament over the executive [UNCAC Article 9(2)]

2.9.1 Is there legislation or other instruments to guide the executive in utilizing all financial instruments, including in regards to procurement, contracts, grants and loans?

2.9.2 Does the parliament approve the expenditure of contingency funds or other funds for which no specific purpose was identified?

2.10 On parliamentary use of audits [UNCAC Article 9(2)]

2.10.1 Does the independent audit institution report to the parliament on its findings?

2.10.2 Does the parliament appoint the head of the independent audit institution?

2.10.3 Is there at least one parliamentary committee responsible for reviewing and scrutinizing all significant audit reports, and does it have adequate resources to carry out this mandate?

2.10.4 Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (military, police, intelligence services) and other ‘sensitive’ programmes provided to the parliament (or relevant committee)?

2.10.5 Does the executive make a report available to the parliament on what steps it has taken to address audit recommendations or findings that indicate a need for remedial action?

2.11 On money laundering and parliamentary engagement in recovery of assets [UNCAC Articles 14 and 58]

2.11.1 Is there legislation in place in your country for the prevention and detection of money laundering?

2.11.2 Has a financial intelligence unit (FIU) been established?

2.11.3 Does the FIU report to the parliament and respond to recommendations and receive budget allocation from the parliament?

2.11.4 Have any money laundering cases been prosecuted in the past five years?

2.11.5 If any money laundering cases have been prosecuted in the last five years, have any corrupt assets been recovered?
3. Standards of conduct

3.1 On establishing public service standards [UNCAC Article 7]

3.1.1 Has the parliament established through legislation standards for the public service, including appointment, compensation and accountability measures?

3.2 On ethics and conduct mechanism [UNCAC Articles 7(3), 8, 52(5) and 52(6)]

3.2.1 Is there a formal and independent ethics and conduct mechanism in place for parliamentarians?

3.2.2 Were parliamentarians from all parties actively involved in the development of the ethics and conduct mechanism?

3.2.3 Are there specific rules in the ethics and conduct mechanism covering all sources of payment or favours?

3.2.4 Are there provisions for parliamentarians to be able to get impartial and informed advice on the rules of ethics and conduct mechanisms?

3.2.5 Are there provisions for parliamentarians to disclose assets and liabilities, including those of family members, on an annual basis to a specific entity or body that is responsible for these records?

3.2.6 In practice, are these provisions for systematic disclosure of the assets and liabilities declarations effectively implemented?

3.2.7 Are the disclosures of assets and liabilities by parliamentarians subject to external audit?

3.2.8 Is there a law to regulate the campaign financing? Are there limitations in place for campaign-related expenditures that are subject to audit?

3.2.9 Is information on the provisions of the ethics and conduct mechanism in place for parliamentarians?

3.2.10 Is there a legal restriction on parliamentarians guaranteeing future employment with the government before resigning a seat?

3.2.11 Is there any regulation in place governing the funding of political parties and the public disclosure of such funding?

3.2.12 Are there provisions in place to ensure that the rules of ethics and conduct are followed in a fair manner?

3.3 On conflict of interest

3.3.1 Is there a clear definition of ‘conflict of interest’?

3.3.2 Do parliamentarians have a legal burden to declare a conflict of interest?

3.3.3 Is the declaration followed by recusal or abstaining from debate or voting on issues related to the conflict of interest?

3.3.4 Is the declaration recorded somewhere (e.g., the public registry) so that the public is aware of it?

3.4 On complaints against parliamentarians and investigations

3.4.1 Is there a procedure for citizens to initiate complaints against parliamentarians?

3.4.2 Are sanctions available if complaints are upheld?

3.5 On legal framework for parliamentary immunity [UNCAC Article 30(2)]

3.5.1 Is there a system of parliamentary immunity in place?

3.5.2 Are there clear, balanced, transparent and enforceable procedures in place for waiving parliamentary immunities in cases of criminal acts or ethical violations committed by parliamentarians while they are in office?

3.5.3 Are there rules in place that stipulate that parliamentary immunity does not apply to actions taken by individual parliamentarians before they have assumed office or after they have left public office?

3.5.4 In the last five years, have any parliamentarians used their immunity to avoid being prosecuted for alleged corruption or other criminal activities?
4. Parliamentary accessibility and outreach

4.1 On civil society [UNCAC Article 13]

4.1.1 Does the parliament engage civil society, media and experts (including international agencies and other non-governmental institutions) in committee hearings and consultations on the prevention of corruption?

4.2 On constituencies [UNCAC Article 13]

4.2.1 Do parliamentarians have functioning and accessible regional or local offices to meet with constituents?

4.2.2 Is there sufficient funding allocated for travel to allow parliamentarians to meet regularly with constituents?

4.2.3 Is there a procedure for citizens and civil society groups to make submissions to a parliamentary committee?

4.2.4 Do parliamentarians inform their constituents about their work on budget, legislation and oversight?

4.2.5 Do citizens have opportunities for direct involvement in the legislation-making process?

4.3 On information [UNCAC Articles 10 and 13]

4.3.1 Is there legislation in place for access to information?

4.3.2 Is access to information legislation comprehensive?

4.3.3 Does the parliament play an active role in the budget process to ensure that sufficient funds are allocated for the effective implementation of any access to information legislation?

4.3.4 Can citizens and/or journalists access records of parliamentary processes and reports of parliamentary committees within a reasonable time period?

4.4 On regulation of lobbying

4.4.1 Are there binding rules in place governing parliamentary lobbying?

4.4.2 Do lobbyists have to register with the parliament?